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 In March of 2012, a company named Aereo began offering a service that provided 
consumers with an inexpensive way to watch broadcast television programming.  
Although many consumers embraced Aereo’s service, the nation’s broadcasters saw 
Aereo as a threat to their revenue stream.  Seeking to put Aereo out of business, the 
broadcasters filed a copyright infringement suit against Aereo, claiming that Aereo 
violated their exclusive right to perform copyrighted works publicly.  The broadcaster’s 
case eventually made its way to the Supreme Court.  The Court, in issuing one of the 
most covered and debated intellectual property law cases to date, ruled that Aereo 
violated copyright law.  This thesis explains and evaluates the Court’s decision and 
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“Patents and copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to 
forensic discussions, to what may be called the metaphysics of the law, where the 
distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined, and, sometimes, almost 
evanescent.” 
 
—Justice Joseph Story, Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
 
 
CHAPTER I: AN INTRODUCTION TO AEREO 
At the National Association of Broadcasters’ annual convention in April of 2013, 
Chase Carey, the COO of 21st Century Fox, threatened to turn the Fox Network into a 
pay-television channel.1  Carey’s comment surprised many.  It’s hard to imagine the 
network that forever changed television with hits like The Simpsons, The X-Files, Family 
Guy, and American Idol, and made billions doing so, would cease to exist as one of 
America’s broadcast networks.  Carey, nevertheless, said the step might be necessary to 
protect 21st Century Fox’s “product and revenue stream.”2   
What would cause Carey to consider such a monumental shift?  The answer: 
Aereo—a company that retransmitted, without a license, broadcast content over the 
Internet to paying subscribers.   
Although many were quick to decry Carey’s comment as saber rattling,3 the 
remark displays the fear many in the television industry had of Aereo.  Aereo, after all, 
                                                




2 Id.  
 
3 The Fox Network provides much-needed programming to the stations owned by and affiliated with 21st 
Century Fox.  In the United States, 21st Century Fox owns 28 broadcast stations and has 187 affiliated 
 2 
stood to hinder the ability of the television networks and television broadcasters to earn 
revenue from retransmission consent agreements, agreements in which cable and satellite 
providers compensate broadcasters for the right to retransmit their signals.  
Retransmission consent agreements provide the television industry with an important 
source of income, and a loss of revenue from them would unquestionably alter the 
television landscape. 
Aereo’s low subscription costs added to fears.  Aereo’s basic service, which 
provided subscribers with access to the broadcast networks and 20 hours of DVR space, 
cost just $8 per month.  The cost of the average monthly cable TV bill, in contrast, will 
soon hit $123.4   
Not surprisingly, a group of television producers, marketers, distributors, and 
broadcasters sued to stop Aereo—claiming the company’s conduct violated copyright 
law. 5  The broadcasters’ legal action ultimately went to the Supreme Court and, in the 
process, became one of the most important copyright cases in recent memory.     
I. How Aereo Worked 
Streaming content created by others over the Internet without a license typically 
constitutes copyright infringement.6  Yet, Aereo contended that it designed a system, 
                                                                                                                                            
broadcast stations.  Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8, 10 (Aug. 19, 2013).  
Because these broadcast stations generate billions in revenue for 21st Century Fox, see e.g., id. at 48, it’s 
unlikely the company would deprive them of programming by turning the Fox Network into a pay 
television channel. 
 
4 Donna Rosato, How to Break Up with Your Cable Company, TIME, July 15, 2014, 
http://time.com/money/2987833/comcast-cancel-ryan-block-time-warner-att-directv-cable-bill-save/.  
 
5 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014).  Throughout this paper, the plaintiffs 
will be collectively referred to as “broadcasters.”   
 
6 See Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. WTV Sys., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003(C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding 
defendant violated copyright law by streaming content from DVD players over the Internet to paying 
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which employed “servers, transcoders, and thousands of dime-sized antennas,” that 
adhered to copyright law.7  Specifically, Aereo asserted that its system complied with the 
law as dictated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Cartoon 
Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.,8 a case commonly referred to as Cablevision.9 
From the subscribers’ perspective, Aereo’s system was simple to operate.  
Subscribers logged in to Aereo using an Internet-enabled television, computer, or mobile 
device.10  Once logged in, subscribers were shown a programming guide that displayed 
the local broadcast content currently airing and the content that would air in the future.11  
For programming currently airing, subscribers could select “Watch” or “Record.”12  
Selecting “Watch” allowed subscribers to view programming “nearly live,” meaning 
Aereo would stream the selected program with a six-to-seven second delay to enable 
pausing and rewinding.13  For content airing in the future, subscribers could only select 
                                                                                                                                            
subscribers); see also WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) (enjoining defendant from 
streaming broadcast television content over the Internet to paying subscribers). 
 
7 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2503 (2014). 
 
8 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 
9 See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (writing that Aereo designed a 
system “based on Cablevision’s holding . . . .”); see also Cmty. Television of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., No. 
2:13CV910DAK, 2014 WL 642828 at *5 (D. Utah Feb. 19, 2014) (“Aereo's response to Plaintiffs’ claims 
of copyright infringement is that it designed its system specifically to avoid the application of the Transmit 
Clause and in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 
. . . .”). 
 
10 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2503; WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 681.   
 
11 Id.   
 
12 WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 681. 
 
13 Id.  One complaint about Aereo’s service was that, unlike with traditional broadcast television, when one 
program finished another did not automatically begin.  After a program concluded, Aereo’s system returned 
subscribers to the programming guide where, if desired, he or she could select to watch or record additional 
programs.  David Talbot, Aereo’s Achilles’ Heel: Delivering Real-Time TV, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, 
Aug. 16, 2013, http://www.technologyreview.com/view/518411/aereos-achilles-heel-delivering-real-time-
tv/. 
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“Record.”   
From Aereo’s perspective, the content-delivery process was far more complex.  
Although highly technical, this system can be boiled down to four steps.  First, when a 
subscriber selected to “Watch” or “Record” a program, one of Aereo’s dime-sized 
antennas tuned to the frequency of the program’s over-the-air broadcast.14  Second, as the 
antenna received the program’s signals, one of Aereo’s transcoders translated those 
signals into data capable of being streamed over the Internet.15  Third, a unique copy of 
the data that composed the program was then saved in the subscriber’s personal directory 
on one of Aereo’s servers.16  Finally, if a subscriber selected “Watch,” Aereo streamed 
the unique copy of the program to the subscriber six or seven seconds after the program 
began airing.17  If a subscriber chose “Record,” Aereo streamed the unique copy to the 
subscriber at his or her request.18    
Three aspects of Aereo’s system should be stressed.  First, Aereo’s dime-sized 
antennas were dynamic, meaning that no two users shared an antenna at a given time.19  
Second, as noted, Aereo made unique copies of programs, meaning that no two 
subscribers shared copies of programs.20  And third, the transmissions Aereo sent to 
                                                                                                                                            
 
14 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2503; WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 682. 
 
15 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2503. 
 
16 Id.; WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 683. 
 
17 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2503; WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 682. 
 
18 WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d at 682. 
 




subscribers were generated from each subscriber’s unique copy, meaning that no two 
subscribers ever received the same transmission.21 
II. An Introduction to the Litigation Surrounding Aereo 
In WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo II”),22 the broadcasters challenged 
Aereo’s system, claiming Aereo violated their exclusive right under the Copyright Act to 
perform copyrighted works publicly.23  Setting up the Supreme Court showdown, the 
Second Circuit held the broadcasters failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits 
and refused to grant their request for a preliminary injunction.    
Looking for a reprieve from the Second Circuit’s ruling, the broadcasters 
appealed to the Supreme Court.  In their petition for writ of certiorari, the broadcasters 
asked the Supreme Court to determine “whether a company ‘publicly performs’ a 
copyrighted television program when it retransmits a [nearly live] broadcast of that 
program to thousands of paid subscribers over the Internet.”24  The broadcasters limited 
their petition to this inquiry even though they believed Aereo’s transmission of recorded 
programs also violated the public performance right and that Aereo’s system infringed 
                                                
21 Id. 
 
22 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 
23 The right to perform works publicly is one of the six exclusive rights granted to copyright holders under 
the Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”).  Precisely, the exclusive rights granted to copyright holders 
are (1) the right “to reproduce copyrighted works in copies or phonorecords”; (2) the right “to prepare 
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work”; (3) the right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of 
the copyright work to the public”; (4) the right “to perform the copyrighted work publicly”; (5) the right “to 
display the copyrighted work publicly”; and (6) the right “in the case of sound recordings, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”  Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 
106 (2012). 
 
24 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-
461).   
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“other exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act, such as the reproduction right.”25  
In granting the broadcasters’ Petition, the Supreme Court thus agreed to address the 
narrow issue of whether Aereo infringed the public performance right “by selling its 
subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to watch television 
programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over the 
air.”26  
The broadcasters cited as a justification for their legal action a portion of the 
Copyright Act known as the Transmit Clause,27 which they said made clear that Aereo 
violated the public performance right.28  The Transmit Clause is one of two sections 
included within the Copyright Act that define what it means to perform a work publicly.29  
For its part, Aereo contended that, because only a single subscriber could receive one of 
its transmissions, it merely transmitted non-actionable private performances.30  Aereo 
also put forth a policy argument, asserting that a ruling against its cause would endanger 
the future of the cloud computing industry.31  
                                                
25 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 686 n.9 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. 
Ct. at 2511-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Networks sued Aereo for several forms of copyright 
infringement, but we are here concerned with a single claim: that Aereo violates the Networks’ ‘exclusive 
righ[t]’ to ‘perform’ their programs ‘publicly.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 
26 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2503. 
 
27 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 
28 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 23-38, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461). 
 
29 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 
30 See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 17-22, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461). 
 
31 Id. at 2. 
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In American Broadcasting Cos.. v. Aereo, Inc. (“Aereo III”),32 the Court issued a 
highly functionalistic six-to-three decision in the broadcasters’ favor.33  In holding that 
Aereo performed the broadcasters’ works publicly and thus committed copyright 
infringement, the majority opinion drew parallels between Aereo’s system and the cable 
systems Congress, in writing the Copyright Act, “sought to bring within the scope” of 
copyright law.34  Although the nation’s high court purported to issue a “limited holding,” 
reverberations from the case will be felt for years to come.35     
The primary purpose of this thesis is twofold: (1) to explain and critically 
examine the Supreme Court’s decision in Aereo III and (2) to evaluate how the Court’s 
decision stands to impact the future of broadcasting.  A secondary, minor, purpose of this 
thesis is to analyze how the Court’s decision impacts the cloud-computing industry.  This 
thesis takes on added importance considering that Aereo III has not been extensively 
discussed in academic journals.  While a few scholars have indirectly discussed the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Aereo III,36 none have significantly examined the case.  
                                                
32 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 
33 Judges are often defined as formalists or functionalists.  Formalists are known for their strict adherence to 
the wording of constitutions, statutes, and precedent.  Accordingly, they advocate for the use of bright-line 
rules that provide future courts with clear guidance.  Functionalists take a far more flexible approach, 
viewing legislative texts and court decisions as breathing documents capable of adapting to changing times.  
Not surprisingly, functionalists advocate for the use of balancing tests that provide courts with broad 
standards.  See generally Copyright Act of 1976—Transmit Clause—ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 371 (2014); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in 
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21 (1998); Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism and 
Functionalism in Federalism Analysis, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1997). 
 
34 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2511. 
 
35 Id. at 2510. 
 
36 See Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 NW. U.L. REV. ONLINE 64 (2014); Kimberlianne 
Podlas, Applying Aereo to the Internet: Understanding Volitional Links to Leaked Films, Television 




Additionally, no scholar has significantly discussed Aereo’s impact on broadcasters’ 
ability to earn revenue from retransmission consent agreements.  
Chase Carey’s comments, which opened this work, demonstrate this thesis’s 
importance.  For now, the broadcast industry as we know it will remain fundamentally 
unchanged.  But, had the Court ruled otherwise, the future of broadcasting may have 
hung in the balance.  
III. Research Questions 
This thesis will address the following research questions: 
(1) What is the basic structure of the broadcast television and cable industries in the 
United States?  What business model do broadcasters use to generate revenue?  How 
did Aereo stand to impact that business model?  This research question is answered in 
Chapter II: How Aereo Stood to Disrupt the Broadcast Business Model. 
(2) In Aereo III, the Supreme Court addressed whether Aereo performed the broadcasters’ 
works.  How did the majority and dissent frame their inquiries into this question?  
How did the majority and dissent decide whether Aereo performed the broadcasters’ 
works?  How will lower courts interpret the majority’s resolution of this question?  
How should the Court have decided whether Aereo performed?  This research 
question is answered in Chapter III: Did Aereo Perform the Broadcasters’ Works and 
Chapter VI: Conclusion.    
(3) Also relevant to the Supreme Court’s analysis of Aereo’s system was the question of 
whether Aereo performed works publicly.  How did the majority frame this question?  
How did it decide whether Aereo performed the broadcasters’ works publicly?  How 
will lower courts interpret the majority’s resolution of this question?  How should the 
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Court have decided whether Aereo performed works publicly?  This research 
question is answered in Chapter IV: Did Aereo Perform the Broadcasters’ Works 
Publicly and Chapter VI: Conclusion.   
(4) What impact, if any, will the Supreme Court’s ruling in Aereo III have on the cloud 
computing industry?  This research question is answered in Chapter V: The Impact on 
the Cloud.  
IV. Methodology 
To identify the cases, statutes, and legislative history used in this thesis, the author 
referenced numerous secondary sources.  The author began by reading applicable 
chapters in three influential legal treatises.  Those treatises were:  
• MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (2014).  
In this work, the author read § 8.14: “The Performance Right” and § 12.04: 
“Secondary Liability of Related Defendants.”          
• WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT (2014).  In this work, the author 
read Chapter Fourteen: “The Right to Publicly Perform the Work” and 
Chapter 21: “Parties.”  Despite its name, chapter 21 contains information on 
secondary liability and when works are performed.       
• HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW (2nd ed. 
1999).  In this work, the author read Chapter Thirteen: “Regulation of Cable 
Television” and Chapter Fourteen: “Regulation of Broadcasting.”   
After consulting the legal treatises, the author read relevant legal journal articles 
written by leaders within the industry.  To locate the journal articles, the author 
performed various keyword searches in WestlawNext.  Words included in the keyword 
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searches were “Aereo,” “Cablevision,” “retransmission consent agreements,” “public 
performance right,” “secondary copyright liability,” and “volitional-conduct 
requirement.”  The author found especially helpful the following journal articles: 
• Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The 
Divergent Evolution of Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363 (2006).   
• Carrie Bodner, Master Copies, Unique Copies and Volitional Conduct: Cartoon 
Network's Implications for the Liability of Cyber Lockers, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
497 (2013). 
• Jane C. Ginsburg, Recent Developments in US Copyright Law—Part II, Caselaw: 
Exclusive Rights on the Ebb? 26 (Columbia Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Papers 2008).  
• Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination of the 
Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. S 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 
FED. COMM. L.J. 102 (1996). 
• Copyright Act of 1976—Transmit Clause—ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 371 (2014). 
• Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC 
Holdings, Inc., 89 OR. L. REV. 505 (2010).37 
To locate the briefs referenced throughout this thesis, the author selected the 
hyperlink for American Broadcasting. Cos, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) in 
                                                
37 Before the Supreme Court issued its decision in Aereo III, a number of student notes were published 
addressing the legal implications of Aereo’s system.  As the Supreme Court’s decision in Aereo III serves 
as this thesis’s primary focus, these notes were not cited due to lack of relevance.  
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WestlawNext.  The author then selected the filings tab, which revealed all briefs filed in 
the case.     
V. Limitations 
The reality that the litigation surrounding Aereo remains ongoing serves as this 
thesis’s primary limitation.  Although the Supreme Court has issued its decision, the 
parties continue to haggle with one another in the lower courts and before administrative 
agencies.  As a result, some factual details regarding Aereo may change after the date of 
this thesis’s publication.  To avoid this limitation, the primary focus of this thesis is 
placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Aereo III and how that decision impacts the 






CHAPTER II: HOW AEREO STOOD TO DISRUPT THE 
BROADCAST BUSINESS MODEL 
Regularly generating profit margins of 20 to 40 percent, newspapers in the United 
States once served as a beacon of economic prosperity.38  Things changed, however, 
when craigslist.com arrived on the scene.  Newspapers, which historically generated 40 
percent of their total revenue from classified ads, lost billions as consumers chose to 
place ads on craigslist instead of in their local newspapers.39  As of this writing, the 
newspaper industry continues to struggle in its effort to regain past economic 
prosperity.40  
As Aereo arrived on the scene, the memory of craigslist’s impact remained fresh 
in the minds of many broadcasters.  Would Aereo disrupt the broadcast industry as 
craigslist disrupted the newspaper industry?  To answer this question, it is necessary to 
understand the basics of the broadcasting and cable industries and the business model 
broadcasters use to generate revenue.  
                                                
38 PHILIP MEYER, THE VANISHING NEWSPAPER: SAVING JOURNALISM IN THE INFORMATION AGE 39 (2nd 
2009). 
 
39 Robert Seamans & Feng Zhu, Responses to Entry in Multi-Sided Markets: The Impact of Craigslist on 
Local Newspapers, 60 MGMT. SCI. 476, 490 (2014).  Seamans and Zhu found that, for newspapers, 
craigslist’s entry into a market “leads to a decrease of 20.7% in classified-ad rates, an increase of 3.3% in 
subscription prices, a decrease of 4.4% in circulation, an increase of 16.5% in differentiation, and a 
decrease of 3.1% in display-ad rates.”  Id.  Additionally, the authors reported that, from 2000 to 2007, 
classified-ad buyers saved $5 billion in revenue by advertising on craigslist instead of in newspapers.  Id.    
 
40 Some experts believe newspapers should abandon their effort to regain 20 to 40 percent profit margins 




I. The Basics of Broadcasting 
A. The Development of the Broadcast Industry 
In order to meet a demand for national sources of programming, the first 
commercial radio networks, NBC and CBS, were formed in the mid-1920s.41  The 
networks were thus created to serve as content creators—capable of generating programs 
for local stations across the nation to broadcast.  In some instances, the networks owned 
and operated the local stations to which they provided programming.42  In others, 
independent third parties owned the stations, and the stations were merely affiliated with 
a network.43     
When television burst onto the landscape, the networks were ready to exploit the 
new medium.  Like in the past, the networks continued to serve as content creators.  In 
many instances, they simply transitioned their popular radio programs, such as The Jack 
Benny Show, Guiding Light, and Amos ‘n’ Andy, to television.44  In others, existing radio 
formats, such as the situation comedy, were transitioned to television.   
Today, the arrangement between local broadcasters and the networks remains 
largely unchanged.  Local broadcast stations continue to receive a portion of their content 
                                                
41 Dominick et al. cited three reasons for the networks’ development, all of which relate to the desire for 
national sources of programming.  See DOMINICK ET AL., BROADCASTING, CABLE, THE INTERNET, AND 
BEYOND 11 (6th ed. 2008).  First, the networks developed because radio executives realized that it “was 
less expensive for one station to produce a program and to have it broadcast simultaneously on three or four 
stations than it was for each station to produce its own program.”  Id.  Second, audiences began to demand 
higher quality programming: the type of programming that could only be generated in large cities and that 
could attract big-name talent.  Id.  Finally, advertisers wanted to reach larger audiences and believed they 
could by attaching their products to national broadcasts.  Id. 
 
42 MICHELE HILMES, NETWORK NATIONS: A TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN 




44 DOMINICK ET AL., supra note 41, at 16. 
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from the network they are either owned by or affiliated with.45  Although the networks no 
longer command the viewership they once did,46 large numbers of Americans continue to 
watch network programming.  The four major television networks—ABC, CBS, FOX, 
and NBC—attract roughly 45 percent of the viewing audience at a given moment and 
regularly produce the 10 highest rated shows in a given week.47  Considering their 
position in the marketplace, it is not surprising that the four major networks served as 
joint plaintiffs in the suit against Aereo.      
B. The Public Interest Standard 
In the early days of radio, interference became the bane of broadcasters’ 
existence.  Because the electromagnetic spectrum (which broadcasters use to transmit 
their signals) is a finite resource,48 the number of broadcasters quickly exceeded the 
number of available frequencies.  Although the Radio Act of 1912 required stations to 
have a license to operate, no governmental agency had the authority to assign 
frequencies.49  As a result, multiple broadcasters would broadcast on the same frequency, 
causing listeners to receive signals that were routinely interrupted.50  
                                                
45 Id. at 107. 
 
46 See JAMES L. BAUGHMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF MASS CULTURE: JOURNALISM, FILMMAKING, AND 
BROADCASTING IN AMERICA SINCE 1941 143 (3rd ed. 2006) (describing how during the late 1970s—in 
spite of new competition from “individual stations, public broadcasting, and cable systems”—“90 percent 
of those homes watching television viewed a network program.”).   
 
47 DOMINICK et al., supra note 41, at 105; see e.g., NIELSEN: TOP TENS & TRENDS, 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/top10s.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2014). 
 
48 See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190, 213 (1943) (“[T]he radio spectrum simply is not large 
enough to accommodate everybody.  There is a fixed natural limitation upon the number of stations that 
can operate without interfering with one another.”).   
 





When the broadcasters called on the government to solve the interference 
problem, Congress passed the Federal Radio Act of 1927 (“Radio Act”).51  The Radio 
Act stipulated that the public owned the electromagnetic spectrum and that private 
entities could be licensed to use, but could never own, a broadcast frequency.52  The 
Radio Act also created the Federal Radio Commission (“FRC”), which was tasked with 
“assign[ing] bands of frequencies . . . for each individual station and determin[ing] the 
power which each station shall use and the time during which it may operate.”53  The 
Radio Act specified, however, that the FRC could grant a license only if doing so would 
be in the “public convenience, interest, or necessity . . . .”54  
 Seeking to centralize the regulation of the telecommunications industry in a single 
federal agency,55 Congress repealed the Radio Act and, in its place, passed the 
Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”).56  The Communications Act, 
which remains valid law despite various amendments, vested the power to regulate the 
telecommunications industry in the newly formed Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”).57  Title III of the Communications Act, which governs broadcasting, left in 
place the key provisions of the Radio Act.  As with the FRC, the FCC has the power to 
                                                
51 47 U.S.C. §§ 81-119 (1925-1926) (repealed 1934).  
 
52 Id. § 81. 
 
53 Id. § 84(c). 
 
54 Id. § 89; see also id. § 91. 
 
55 G. Hamilton Loeb, The Communications Act Policy Toward Competition: A Failure to Communicate, 1 
DUKE L.J. 1, 22 (1978). 
 
56 See 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2006); Bliss, supra note 49, at 11. 
 
57 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1940). 
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assign frequencies but can grant licenses only if the “public convenience, interest, or 
necessity will be served thereby . . . .”58     
The Communications Act, like the Radio Act, did not define the phrase “public 
convenience, interest, or necessity.”  The phrase’s definition, nevertheless, has come to 
stand for the idea that broadcasters must serve as trustees of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.59  In other words, because the electromagnetic spectrum is a limited resource 
owned by the public, those fortunate enough to receive licenses to broadcast must act in 
ways that benefit the public.   
As part of their public interest requirements, broadcasters must transmit their 
signals over-the-air to the viewing public and cannot charge the viewing public for 
receiving those signals.60  Through this requirement, Congress has sought to ensure that 
citizens receive diverse sources of local programming,61 a goal the Supreme Court has 
referred to as a “governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central 
to the First Amendment.”62  
 
                                                
58 See Id. §307(a).    
 
59 The Supreme Court wrote in National Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (quoting 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(g)), “The ‘public interest’ to be served under the 
Communications Act is . . . the interest of the listening public in ‘the larger and more effective use of radio.”  
The Court added in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969): “It is the right of the 
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.” See CONSTANCE LEDOUX 
BOOK, DIGITAL TELEVISION: DTV AND THE CONSUMER 69 (2004) (“The public trustee model maintains 
that the airwaves are a limited resource belonging to the public, and only those most capable of serving the 
pubic interest are entrusted to use them.”).   
 
60 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (“In the Communications Act of 1934, 
Congress created a system of free broadcast service . . . .”). 
 
61 See S. REP. NO. 102-92, p. 58 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102-628, p. 63 (1992).   
 
62 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 663. 
 
 17 
II. The Basics of Cable 
A. The Development of the Cable Industry 
In the early 1950s cable television systems, back then referred to as community 
antenna TV (“CATV”), began to sprout up across the country—providing Americans 
with an alternative delivery system through which to receive television programming.  
Cable television derived from necessity.  Many Americans lived in locations too remote 
to receive broadcast signals.  To get around this limitation, mom-and-pop operations 
began placing antennas in locations (usually on hilltops) capable of receiving broadcast 
signals.63  Once received, signals were amplified and then, using coaxial cables strung to 
utility polls, transmitted into subscribers’ homes.64   
 Because cable systems charged subscribers installation and subscription fees,65 
what started as a novel idea quickly transformed into a business.  By the mid-1960s the 
cable industry had exploded, and broadcasters began viewing the nascent industry as a 
threat.66  Although broadcasters appreciated the greater audience reach cable television 
provided,67 cable systems did not pay broadcasters for the right to distribute their signals.  
Moreover, in addition to providing subscribers with access to signals from local 
                                                
63 See SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE AUDIENCE 35 (2013); see also Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists 
Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 392 (1968). 
 
64 Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 392 (1968); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 162 (1968). 
 
65 Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 162. 
 
66 CRAWFORD, supra note 63, at 35-36.  The Supreme Court wrote in 1968, “It has been more recently 
estimated that ‘new [cable] systems are being founded at the rate of more than one per day, and . . . 
subscribers . . . signed on at the rate of 15,000 per month.’”  Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 162 (quoting Note, 
The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368 (1965-1966)).   
 
67 See BOOK, supra note 59, 148. 
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broadcast stations, cable companies began transmitting signals from distant stations.68  
Then, in the 1970s, cable systems also began offering cable-only channels like HBO, 
Showtime, CNN, and ESPN.  Thus, instead of serving as a way for those in hilly terrains 
to receive local broadcast signals, cable systems began offering enhancements, in the 
form of additional channels, to subscribers’ viewing experiences.    
B. Legal Challenges to CATV Systems 
Faced with the explosive growth of cable, content creators used the court system 
to bring legal challenges.  In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,69 United 
Artists Television challenged a CATV’s practice of distributing copyrighted content 
without a license.  United Artists owned the copyrights in numerous films broadcast on 
channels the cable system, Fortnightly, retransmitted to its subscribers.70  Although the 
local broadcast stations that initially aired United’s works possessed licenses, Fortnightly 
did not possess a license authorizing it to retransmit the works.71   
The question thus became whether Fortnightly infringed upon United Artist’s 
exclusive right under the Copyright Act of 1909 to perform copyrighted works publicly.72  
Siding with the defendant, the Supreme Court held in 1968 that no such infringement 
occurred based on its conclusion that CATV systems do not “perform” when 
retransmitting broadcast content to subscribers.73   
                                                
68 Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. at 163. 
 
69 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
 
70 Id. at 391-92. 
 
71 Id. at 393. 
 




The Court started with the premise that broadcasters perform when they transmit 
content over-the-air and that viewers, by receiving those signals, do not perform.74  The 
Court thus treated viewers as passive beneficiaries even though viewers provided the 
equipment (that is, the television set and antenna) to “convert electronic signals into 
audible sound and visible images.”75  The Court then wrote that Fortnightly was more 
like a viewer than a broadcaster because, even though “a CATV system plays an ‘active’ 
role in making reception possible in a given area . . . so do ordinary television sets and 
antennas.”76  It added:  
If an individual erected an antenna on a hill, strung a cable to his house, 
and installed the necessary amplifying equipment, he would not be 
“performing” the programs he received on his television set. The result 
would be no different if several people combined to erect a cooperative 
antenna for the same purpose. The only difference in the case of CATV is 
that the antenna system is erected and owned not by its users but by an 
entrepreneur.77 
 
 Consistent with its holding in Fortnightly, the Supreme Court in Teleprompter 
Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System78 held in 1974 that a cable system does not 
perform when it imports broadcast signals from locales far more distant than the ones at 
issue in Fortnightly.  It wrote, “[A] CATV system does not lose its status as a 
                                                                                                                                            
 




76 Id. at 399. 
 
77 Id. at 400. 
 
78 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
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nonbroadcaster, and thus a ‘non-performer’ for copyright purposes, when the signals it 
carries are from distant rather than local sources.”79 
C. The Statutory and Administrative Regulation of Cable 
Under the Court’s holdings in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, cable systems could 
retransmit broadcast content without consent and escape copyright liability.  Viewing this 
as a problem, Congress wrote the Copyright Act of 1976 to, in part, overrule the Court’s 
holdings in those cases80 and bring cable systems within the scope of copyright law.81   
Congress achieved this goal in three ways.82  First, in what according to the 
Copyright Act’s legislative history was an explicit rejection of the holdings in Fortnightly 
and Teleprompter, the Court changed what it means to “perform” a motion picture or 
television program.83  Now, to “perform” a motion picture or television program means 
“to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.”84  
As the Court correctly noted in Aereo III,  “Under this new language, both the 
                                                
79 Id. at 409.  In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975), the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the rulings in Fortnightly and Teleprompter.  In Aiken, the Court faced the question of whether 
the defendant infringed the plaintiffs’ right to perform works publicly for profit when he used a radio to 
receive broadcast signals and then amplified those signals to customers in his restaurant.  Id. at 152-53.  
The Court sided with the defendant, writing that “this Court has in two recent decisions explicitly 
disavowed the view that the reception of an electronic broadcast can constitute a performance, when the 
broadcaster himself is licensed to perform the copyrighted material that he broadcasts.”  Id. at 160-61.  
Instrumental to the Court’s decision was its view of the theoretical justification of copyright law.  In line 
with the utilitarian conception of copyright law, the Court wrote: “The immediate effect of our copyright 
law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to 
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”  Id. at 156.  
 
80 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2505 (2014). 
 




83 Id. at 2505-06.  The Copyright Act’s legislative history states that the Supreme Court’s “narrow 
construction of the word ‘perform’” under the Copyright Act of 1909 has been “completely overturned by 
the present bill and its broad definition of ‘perform’ in section 101.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 86-87 
(1976). 
 
84 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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broadcaster and the viewer ‘perform,’ because they both show a television program’s 
images and make audible the program’s sounds.”85   
Second, Congress included the Transmit Clause in the Copyright Act.  Under the 
Transmit Clause, cable systems (along with a host of other services) perform works 
publicly when they transmit those works to the public.86  The Copyright Act’s legislative 
history, in fact, explicitly states that “a cable television system is performing when it 
retransmits . . . [a] broadcast to its subscribers . . . .”87   
Finally, Congress added § 111 to the Copyright Act, which established a 
compulsory licensing system that automatically permits cable systems to transmit the 
programs that comprise a broadcaster’s signal so long as the cable system pays the 
compulsory fee established by the statute.88  In other words, if the compulsory license is 
complied with, a cable system can retransmit a copyrighted program without receiving 
the express permission of the individual or entity that holds the copyright in the 
program.89         
                                                
85 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2506 (emphasis in original) (citing H.R. REP. at 63). 
 
86 Id. at 2506; 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 
87 H.R. REP., at 63. 
 
88 Am. Broad. Cos.,134 S. Ct. at 2506; 17 U.S.C. § 111. 
 
Under the Copyright Act, a “cable system” is defined as  
 
a facility, located in any State, territory, trust territory, or possession of the United States, 
that in whole or in part receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more 
television broadcast stations licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, and 
makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, 
or other communications channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for 
such service. For purposes of determining the royalty fee under subsection (d)(1), two or 
more cable systems in contiguous communities under common ownership or control or 
operating from one headend shall be considered as one system.  
 
89 CHARLES D. FERRIS & FRANK W. LLOYD, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION: CABLE, BROADCASTING, 
SATELLITE, AND THE INTERNET § 7.20[1] (2014). 
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Subsequent to the Copyright Act, the FCC and Congress regularly took action to 
regulate (or, at times, deregulate) the growing cable industry.90  These efforts culminated 
in the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (“Cable 
Act”),91 which remains good law.   
At the time of the Cable Act’s passage, Congress believed the future of free local 
broadcast television to be in jeopardy.92  Congress offered numerous reasons for this 
conclusion.  First, Congress believed that cable systems, in order to generate more 
advertising revenue for their own content, possessed an economic incentive not to carry 
broadcasters’ signals.93  Second, cable had drastically expanded from its humble 
beginnings.  By the 1990s, cable had penetrated “over 60 percent of households with 
televisions” and, consequently, become “a dominant nationwide video medium.”94  Third, 
at the time, nothing required cable systems to transmit broadcasters’ signals.95     
                                                                                                                                            
 
90 See, e.g., FIRST REPORT AND ORDER, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965); SECOND ORDER AND REPORT, 2 F.C.C. 2d 
725 (1966); Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 601-639 (2012).  
 
91 Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 
92 47 U.S.C. § 521(a)(16). 
 
93 Id. § 521(a)(15). 
 
94 Id. § 521(a)(3). 
 
95 Id. § 521(a)(16).  On two previous occasions, the FCC created rules requiring cable systems to transmit 
local broadcasters’ signals.  Thomas W. Hazlett, Digitizing Must-Carry Under Turner Broadcasting v. FCC 
(1997), 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV., 141, 143 (2000).  On both occasions, the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Columbia held the rules violated the First Amendment.  In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 
1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986), for instance, the court deemed the FCC’s 
rules a content-neutral regulation but, inter alia, found the FCC could not show the rules promoted a 
substantial government interest.  The court wrote, “After the passage of nearly two decades, and despite its 
demonstrated capacity to do so, the Commission has failed entirely to determine whether the evil the rules 
seek to correct ‘is a real or merely a fanciful threat.’”  Id. (quoting Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 
9, 50 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam ), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977)).  See also Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 
835 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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Thus, in the Cable Act, Congress included a provision stating, “No cable system . 
. . shall retransmit the signal of a broadcasting station, or any part thereof ” unless (1) the 
cable system receives the station’s “retransmission consent” or (2) the station enforces its 
rights under the Act’s must-carry rules.96  In other words, the Cable Act created a scheme 
that cable systems must comply with before transmitting all or part of a broadcaster’s 
signal.  This scheme differs from § 111 of the Copyright Act, which created a 
compulsory license for the individual programs that comprise broadcasters’ signals.  As 
Charles Lubinsky wrote, “While rebroadcast of programs is governed by section 111 of 
the 1976 Copyright Act, retransmission of signals is governed by . . . [the Cable Act].”97 
                                                
96 47 U.S.C. § 325(b) (emphasis added).   
 
Under the Cable Act, a cable system is defined as 
 
A facility consisting of a set of closed transmission paths and associated signal 
generation, reception, and control equipment that is designed to provide cable service 
which includes video programming and which is provided to multiple subscribers within 
a community, but such term does not include: 
(1) A facility that services only to retransmit the television signals of one or 
more television broadcast stations; 
(2) A facility that serves subscribers without using any public right-of-way; 
(3) A facility of a common carrier which is subject, in whole or in part, to the 
provisions of Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, except 
that such facility shall be considered a cable system to the extent such facility is 
used in the transmission of video programming directly to subscribers, unless 
the extent of such use is solely to provide interactive on-demand services; 
(4) An open video system that complies with Section 653 of the 
Communications Act; or 
(5) Any facilities of any electric utility used solely for operating its electric 
utility systems. 
 
47 C.F.R. § 76.5 (2014).  Also included in the definition of a cable system is “any multichannel program 
video distributor.”  As of this writing, a multichannel video program distributor is defined as “an entity 
such as . . . a cable operator, a BRS/EBS provider, a direct broadcast satellite service, a television receive-
only satellite program distributor, or a video dialtone program service provider, who makes available for 
purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming, whether or not a 
licensee.”  Id. § 76.71. 
 
97 Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination of the Retransmission 
Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. S 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 102 (1996). 
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The Cable Act’s “must-carry” rules require cable systems to transmit the signals 
of local broadcasters that request carriage.98  In other words, if a broadcaster enforces its 
rights under the must-carry rules, the applicable cable system(s) must transmit that 
broadcaster’s signals.  By forcing cable systems to retransmit broadcasters’ signals, 
Congress enabled broadcasters to maintain advertising revenue in the face of the ever-
expanding cable industry.  Nevertheless, the rules come with a catch: broadcasters that 
invoke their rights under the must-carry rules are prohibited from receiving any form of 
compensation from cable systems.99     
If a broadcaster does not enforce its rights under the must-carry rules, as noted, 
cable systems must receive the broadcaster’s “retransmission consent” before 
retransmitting its signals.  In exchange for a broadcaster’s retransmission consent, cable 
systems usually provide broadcasters with monetary compensation.100  Thus, for 
broadcasters looking to increase revenue, entering into retransmission consent 
negotiations serves as an attractive alternative to the Cable Act’s must-carry rules.  It 
                                                
98 Ferris & Lloyd, supra note 89, § 7.15[2][a]; see also 47 U.S.C. § 534; see also BOOK, supra note 59, at 
151 (“The administrative basis for providing the must carry legislation was to ensure the viability of a free 
over-the-air broadcast system.”).   
 
99 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(10).  The Cable Act’s must-carry rules were challenged in Turner Broadcasting Sys., 
Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994).  The Supreme Court found the rules burdened free speech 
because they “interfere[d] with cable operators’ editorial discretion by compelling them to offer carriage 
to . . .  broadcast stations.”  Id. at 643-64.  However, because the rules did not target the content of cable 
systems’ speech and only “incidentally” burdened free expression, the Court held the must-carry rules were 
content neutral.  Id.  Accordingly, as a content-neutral restriction, the Court wrote the rules should be 
subject to intermediate scrutiny and not the more demanding strict scrutiny standard.  Id. at 642.  Thus, the 
rules “would be sustained under the First Amendment if . . . [they] advance[] important governmental 
interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and do[] not burden substantially more speech than 
necessary to further those interests.”  Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 189 
(1997) (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).  In Turner II, the Court held the rules 
met this burden because they advanced the important government interests of  “(1) preserving the benefits 
of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information 
from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for television 
programming.”  Id. at 189 (citing Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662). 
 
100 47 U.S.C. § 325(b); see also CRAWFORD, supra note 63, at 133-34. 
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should be noted that, when negotiating for retransmission consent, broadcasters are 
required “to negotiate in good faith.”101  This means, among other things, that 
broadcasters cannot refuse to enter into a retransmission consent negotiation.102   
If an agreement over retransmission consent cannot be reached, the cable system 
is prohibited from retransmitting the broadcaster’s signals.103  This scenario was seen in 
August of 2013 when Time Warner Cable temporarily failed to reach a retransmission 
consent agreement with CBS.104  As a result of the impasse, Time Warner Cable 
subscribers were deprived of CBS programming in eight of the nation’s largest markets, 
including New York and Los Angeles, for a month.105  
Today, the Cable Act’s must-carry rules remain an attractive option for small 
broadcasters that want to ensure carriage but lack the bargaining power to enter into 
lucrative retransmission consent agreements with cable systems.106  Broadcasters who 
select to pursue the retransmission consent option cannot then invoke their rights under 
the Cable Act’s must-carry rules if retransmission consent negotiations fail.  After a 
broadcaster selects either must-carry or retransmission consent, it cannot pursue the 
                                                
101 Id. § 325(b)(3)(C)(ii).  
 
102 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(b)(1) (2014). 
 
103 Note, Tilling the Vast Wasteland: The Case for Reviving Localism in Public Interest Obligations for 
Cable Television, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1034, 1041 (2013). 
 





106 See generally Kevin Goldberg, Contemplating Life Without Compulsory Licenses: At Congress’s 




alternate option for a three-year period.107  Despite the danger of not receiving carriage, 
in an effort to increase revenue, more and more broadcasters are entering into 
retransmission consent negotiations with cable systems.  According to the FCC’s most 
recent data on the subject, only 37 percent of broadcasters rely on the Cable Act’s must-
carry rules while the rest pursue the retransmission consent option.108 
III. The Broadcasting Business Model 
In the early days, radio and television manufacturers created broadcast content to 
bolster the sales of radio and television sets.109  It did not take long, however, for 
broadcasters to develop ways to monetize the content they used to sell those sets.  The 
original, and still most common, way broadcasters make money is through advertising.  
Recently, however, broadcasters have begun using retransmission consent agreements, a 
direct result of the Cable Act, to generate revenue.  Today, broadcasters primarily 
generate money using a dual-revenue stream composed of (1) advertising and (2) 
retransmission consent agreements.  To a lesser extent, broadcasters also earn revenue by 
licensing their content to online distributors like Hulu and Netflix and from § 111’s 
compulsory license.  
 
                                                
107 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(B).     
 
108 In the Matter of Amendment of the Commissions Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 26 F.C.C. 
Rcd. 2718, 2746 n. 13 (2011). 
 
It should be noted that the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999 established a similar system 
for satellite systems.  See 47 U.S.C. § 338 (2012).  Under it, satellite systems (like the DISH Network) are 
subject to must-carry rules and, if the broadcaster does not select must-carry, are required to receive 
retransmission consent before retransmitting the broadcaster’s signal.  Rob Frieden, Analog and Digital 
Must-Carry Obligations of Cable and Satellite Television Operators in the United States, 15 MEDIA L. & 
POL’Y 230, 241 (2006). 
 
109 CRAWFORD, supra note 63, at 129. 
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A. The First Prong of the Dual-Revenue Stream: Advertising 
Advertising has served as the primary source of revenue for broadcasters since the 
1920s.110  For decades, broadcasters were content with the money they derived from that 
single revenue stream. 111  After all, as a result of the lack of competition in the 
marketplace, advertisers flocked to broadcasters and were willing to purchase billions of 
dollars in advertising from them.112   
Things have changed, however.  As a result of the drastic expansion of the cable 
and satellite industries described above, the average U.S. home with a television set now 
receives more than 100 channels.113  The increase in marketplace competition caused by 
the greater number of channels available has caused broadcasters to lose advertising 
revenue.  For instance, in 1998, cable channels received 24 percent of the revenue 
derived from television advertising.114  A decade later, that number had increased to 39 
percent.115  In fact, “except for political ads and prescription drugs, spending on 
                                                
110 By 1929, companies were spending more than $20 million on radio advertisements per year.  DOMINICK 
ET AL., supra note 41, at 11.  Today, it is common for local broadcasters to generate roughly $20 billion in 
advertising revenue per year.  See THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER’S PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN 
JOURNALISM: THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2013, http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/local-tv-audience-
declines-as-revenue-bounces-back/6-local-broadcast-tv-advertising-revenue-grew-in-2012/ (last visited 
Aug. 29, 2014).  
 
111 CRAWFORD, supra note 63, at 131; See Brian Stelter, TV Circling The Wagons Over Aereo, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2013, at B1.  
 
112 CRAWFORD, supra note 63, at 131-32. 
 
113 NIELSEN: AVERAGE U.S. HOME NOW RECEIVES A RECORD 118.6 TV CHANNELS, ACCORDING TO 
NIELSEN, http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/press-room/2008/average_u_s__home.html (last visited Dec. 8, 
2013). 
 






broadcast-television advertising has markedly and steadily decreased.”116  The recession 
has also taken its toll on broadcasters.  Before the recession hit in 2006, local 
broadcasters generated $22.8 billion in advertising revenue.117  In 2009, during the 
recession’s peak, that same number dropped to $15.8 billion.118 
B. The Second Prong of the Dual-Revenue Stream: Retransmission Consent 
Agreements 
To ameliorate the harms caused by losses in advertising revenue, broadcasters 
have sought compensation from retransmission consent agreements.  In the early 2000s, 
broadcasters generated little revenue from these agreements.  In 2001, for instance, 
broadcasters generated only $11 million from retransmission consent.119  This may be 
because, when initially engaging in retransmission consent negotiations, broadcasters 
routinely asked cable providers for compensation in the form of space in the cable 
provider’s lineup.120  In fact, “[i]n the 1990s, ABC used retransmission consent to get 
ESPN2 carried, NBC used it to get America’s Talking (now on MSNBC) carried, and 
Fox used it to get cable operators to carry FX.”121     
                                                
116 Id. 
 
117 THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER’S PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM: THE STATE OF THE NEWS 
MEDIA 2013, http://stateofthemedia.org/2013/local-tv-audience-declines-as-revenue-bounces-back/6-local-




119 Katerina Eva Matsa, Time Warner vs. CBS: The High Stakes of their Fight Over Fees, 
PEWRESEARCHCENTER, Aug. 21, 2013, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/08/21/time-warner-vs-
cbs-the-high-stakes-of-their-fight-over-fees/. 
 





Today, however, broadcasters are increasingly asking for and receiving monetary 
compensation when negotiating for retransmission consent.  In 2014, broadcasters are 
expected to generate $2.8 billion in revenue from retransmission consent,122 a number 
that is predicted to climb to $7.6 billion by 2019.123  As an additional example, consider 
Nexstar Broadcasting Group, a company that owns or provides services to 72 broadcast 
stations.124  In 2008, 4.5 percent of Nexstar Broadcasting’s revenue derived from 
retransmission consent agreements.125  Just four years later, in 2012, retransmission 
consent agreements generated 14.5 percent of the company’s revenue.126   
Retransmission consent agreements are appealing to broadcasters because the 
agreements enable broadcasters to mimic the business model used by cable channels.  
Historically, cable channels have generated revenue not only from advertising but also 
from the subscriber fees they collect from cable and satellite systems.  While broadcasters 
have struggled recently, cable channels have taken advantage of their dual-revenue 
stream and have been “flush[ed] with cash for the past twenty-five years.”127  
                                                
122 Matsa, supra note 119. 
 
123 SNL Kagan Releases Updated Industry Retransmission Fee Projections, PRWEB, Mar. 12, 2014, 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/11/prweb11360552.htm. 
 
124 Nexstar Broadcasting Group to Acquire Seven Television Stations in Four Markets for $87.5 Million in 








127 Ken Auletta, CBS, Time Warner Cable, and the Disruption of TV, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 19, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/currency/2013/08/cbs-time-warner-cable-and-the-disruption-of-
tv.html.  Consider that in the fourth quarter of 2012, 57 percent of Disney’s total operating income derived 
from its cable channels.  See Ken Badenhausen, Why ESPN Is Worth $40 Billion As The World's Most 
Valuable Media Property, FORBES, Nov. 9, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2012/11/ 
09/why-espn-is-the-worlds-most-valuable-media-property-and-worth-40-billion.  As another example, 
reflect on the extent to which ESPN’s revenue has increased in recent years.  In 2009, ESPN generated $6.3 
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Reflecting on broadcasters’ use of the dual-revenue stream, Chase Carey said:  
It is clear that the broadcast business needs a dual revenue stream from 
both ad and subscription to be viable . . . . We simply cannot provide the 
type of quality sports, news, and entertainment content that we do from an 
ad-supported-only business model.  We have no choice but to develop 
business solutions that ensure we continue to remain in the driver's seat of 
our own destiny.128 
 
Perhaps no group benefits more from the fees derived from retransmission 
consent agreements than the networks.  In addition to owning many local broadcast 
stations throughout the country, the networks have begun soliciting portions of the 
revenue their affiliated stations receive from retransmission consent agreements.129  SNL 
Kagan reports that “[f]or major networks, sharing in affiliates’ retrans revenue stream is 
now a given,” with the networks taking at least half of the income affiliated stations 
derive from them.130  
It should be noted, however, that money generated from retransmission consent 
agreements continues to pale in comparison to the money generated from traditional 
advertising.  Roughly 88 percent of broadcast revenue continues to come from 
                                                                                                                                            
billion in revenue.  Just a decade earlier, it generated $1.8 billion.  See Is Free TV Coming to and End? 
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advertising131 and, in 2013, broadcasters generated $16 billion more in advertising 
revenue than in revenue derived from retransmission consent agreements.132    
IV. Discussion 
Aereo threatened to disrupt the broadcast business model by impacting the 
retransmission consent prong of the broadcasters’ dual-revenue stream.  The advertising 
prong, in contrast, would have remained unharmed. 
Ratings determine the amount companies pay for advertisements.  If Aereo’s 
subscribers were not included in rating computations, broadcasters would have 
experienced decreases in revenue derived from advertising.133  In 2013, however, Nielson 
obviated this fear when it pledged to count individuals who view television content using 
Internet-based services like Aereo.134  As a result, the advertising prong of the 
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broadcasters’ dual-revenue stream should have remained unaffected by Aereo’s 
service.135 
Aereo stood to impact the retransmission consent prong in two ways.  First, 
because Aereo contended it was not a cable system, it claimed it did not have to obtain 
broadcasters’ retransmission consent before retransmitting their signals.136  Thus, while 
cable and satellite systems must haggle with broadcasters over retransmission consent, 
Aereo claimed it could retransmit broadcasters’ signals without providing any form of 
compensation.137   
Second, if Aereo’s service had become popular, fewer individuals would have 
used cable and satellite to watch broadcast content.  Consequently, cable and satellite 
systems would have deemed broadcast content less valuable and provided the 
broadcasters with less compensation when negotiating for retransmission consent.138  As 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York put it, “[T]he evidence 
shows that by poaching viewers from cable or other companies that license Plaintiff’s 
content, Aereo’s activities will damage Plaintiffs’ ability to negotiate retransmission 
                                                
135 Hearst Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32, 41 (D. Mass. 2013) (ruling that a broadcaster 
failed to make a convincing showing that Aereo would irreparably harm its ability to generate advertising 
revenue.) 
 
136 See Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385 § 4 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2012)); Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, 47 
U.S.C. § 338 (2012); see also Brief of the National Association of Broadcasters et al. as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 21, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461). 
 
137 Stelter, supra note 111.  
 
138 See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., 915 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 
2012).   
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agreements, as these companies will demand concessions from Plaintiffs to make up for 
this decrease in viewership.”139 
Moreover, the harm to broadcasters would have increased exponentially if other 
companies mimicked Aereo’s system or partnered with Aereo.  Before the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Aereo III, numerous companies, including AT&T and the DISH 
Network, approached Aereo about entering into partnerships.140  Such partnerships could 
have harmed broadcasters because the partnerships could have enabled pay-television 
providers to reduce, or potentially avoid altogether, retransmission consent fees.  
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CHAPTER III: DID AEREO PERFORM THE 
BROADCASTERS’ WORKS? 
 The broadcasters, recognizing the harm Aereo posed to their dual-revenue stream, 
attempted to put Aereo out of business by proving it infringed upon their copyrights by 
publicly performing works without a license.  Before it could decide whether Aereo 
performed works publicly, however, the majority of the justices in Aereo III wrote that it 
had to determine whether Aereo performed at all.141  It is noteworthy, to say the least, 
that the majority opinion would begin its inquiry in this manner.  None of the lower 
courts felt the need to address whether Aereo performed—operating under the 
assumption that it did.   
The lower courts’ reluctance to address the issue can be attributed to how the case 
was litigated.  At the lower court level, Aereo primarily limited itself to arguing that its 
transmissions were not “to the public.”142  When the case reached the Supreme Court, 
however, Aereo expanded its argument by asserting that its users, not Aereo itself, were 
the ones who performed the broadcasters’ works.143   
Had the Court ruled that Aereo did not perform, the broadcasters’ suit would have 
                                                
141 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014). 
 
142 See, e.g., Consolidated Brief of Defendant-Counter-Claimant at 4, WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 
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143 Brief of Respondent at 40-47, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461). 
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failed.144  The broadcasters limited their claim to arguing that Aereo was directly, and not 
also secondarily, liable for copyright infringement.  To win a suit for the direct 
infringement of the public performance right, the plaintiff must establish that the 
defendant performed the copyrighted works at issue.  Thus, if the Court had ruled that 
Aereo did not perform the broadcasters’ works, Aereo could not have been held directly 
liable.   
I. Statutory Text 
The Copyright Act states that to “perform” a motion picture or other audiovisual 
work means “to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it 
audible.”145  Under this broad definition, broadcasters and cable systems perform when 
they transmit television programs, and viewers perform when they use a television set to 
receive those programs.146  
II. The Difference Between Direct and Secondary Copyright Liability 
 The broadcasters’ decision to limit their claim against Aereo to one of direct 
liability has been criticized by many commentators and the dissent in Aereo III, all of 
whom believed Aereo was also liable for secondary copyright infringement.147  To 
understand this argument, and the role secondary liability played in the case, it is 
necessary to comprehend the difference between direct and secondary copyright 
infringement.         
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There are two forms of copyright infringement: direct copyright infringement and 
secondary copyright infringement.148  A defendant becomes directly liable for copyright 
infringement when he “violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner 
provided by sections 106 through 122 [of the Copyright Act] . . . .”149  For example, an 
individual would become a direct infringer if he, barring some sort of defense, infringed 
the reproduction right by photocopying a work, infringed the public performance right by 
performing a work in a place open to the public, or infringed the public display right by 
displaying a work for all to see.   
One becomes secondarily liable for copyright infringement when he assists others 
in committing direct copyright infringement.150  Over the years, the courts have 
recognized two types of secondary liability: (1) vicarious liability and (2) contributory 
                                                
148 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
149 17 U.S.C. § 501. 
 
150 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433, 435 (1984); see 
also Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, The Secret Life of Legal Doctrine: The Divergent Evolution of 
Secondary Liability in Trademark and Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1366 (2006).   
 
Although the Copyright Act does not expressly permit courts to “impose liability on anyone other than 
direct infringers,” Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996), the power to 
impose liability on secondary infringers has been inferred through the Copyright Act’s use of the wording 
“to do and to authorize” in § 106.  See 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:43 (2014) (citing 
Gener-Villar v. Adcom Group, Inc., 2007 WL 2597106, at * 7 (D.P.R, Aug, 24, 2007)).  The Copyright 
Act’s legislative history also supports the proposition that the courts have the power to impose liability on 
secondary infringers.  There, Congress wrote:  
 
Use of the phrase “to authorize” is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of 
contributory infringers. For example, a person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy 
of a motion picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in the business of renting it 
to others for purposes of unauthorized public performance. 
  
H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 61.  
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infringement.  An act of direct infringement serves as a prerequisite for both vicarious 
liability and contributory infringement.151    
Vicarious liability is “an outgrowth of the agency principle of respondeat 
superior,”152 the tort law doctrine stating that an employer or principle can be held liable 
for the actions taken by his employees and agents.153  One will be deemed vicariously 
liable “if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a 
direct financial interest in such activities.”154  
Contributory infringement, which also has origins in tort law, “stems from the 
notion that one who directly contributes to another’s infringement should be held 
accountable.”155  One will be deemed a contributory infringer if he, “with knowledge of 
the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct 
of another . . . .”156  A major difference between vicarious liability and contributory 
infringement is the presence of knowledge.  Whereas contributory infringement requires 
knowledge, a defendant can be deemed vicariously liable even if he has no knowledge of 
the underlying act of direct infringement.   
The Supreme Court most famously addressed contributory liability in 1984 in 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.157  There, the Court evaluated 
                                                
151 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Religious 
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whether Sony’s sale of the Betamax VTR (“VTR”) violated copyright law.158  The most 
common use of the VTR, according to the Court was “time-shifting,” “the practice of 
recording a program to view it once at a later time, and thereafter erasing it.”159  The 
plaintiffs, a group of content creators that held the copyrights in various television 
programs,160 argued that Sony’s sale of the VTR constituted contributory infringement 
because the VTR enabled consumers to reproduce others’ copyrighted works without 
permission.161  The Court disagreed.   
In reaching its decision, the Court imported from patent law the staple article of 
commerce doctrine.  The staple article of commerce doctrine, as applied to copyright law, 
holds that “the sale of copying equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, 
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, 
unobjectionable purposes.”162  And to be “used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes,” 
the product merely needs to “be capable of substantial noninfringing uses,” or, as the 
Court put it later in the opinion, “commercially significant noninfringing uses.”163   
Although it declined to quantify what exactly constitutes “commercially 
significant noninfringing uses,” the Court found that the VTR met this burden for two 
independent reasons.  First, the Court found that there was a “significant likelihood that 
substantial numbers of copyright holders who license their works for broadcast on free 
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television would not object to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers.”164  
Second, the Court held that time shifting constituted a legitimate fair use because, among 
other reasons, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Sony’s sale of the VTR would 
cause “some meaningful likelihood of future harm”165 to the potential market for their 
copyrighted works.166      
III. The Volitional-Conduct Requirement 
By the 1990s, the doctrines of direct and secondary liability were firmly 
established within copyright law.  Courts, nevertheless, struggled to differentiate between 
direct and secondary infringers.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Sony provided little 
guidance in this area.  Although the Court evaluated the VTR within the context of 
secondary liability, it offered little justification for why it chose to do so.  Instead, it 
simply acknowledged that “‘the lines between direct infringement, contributory 
infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn . . . .’”167 
The discussion over how to differentiate between direct and secondary infringers 
reached a boiling point in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line 
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166 Id. at 456.  Fair use is one of the many affirmative defenses permitted in copyright law.  Under the 
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DICTIONARY 676 (9TH ED. 2009).   
 
167 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984) (quoting Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 457 (C.D. Cal. 1979)). 
 
 40 
Communication Services, Inc.168  Netcom arose after Dennis Erlich, a critic of the Church 
of Scientology, posted works written by the church’s founder, L. Ron Hubbard, to an 
online newsgroup.169  Unsurprisingly, the organization that owned the copyrights in 
Hubbard’s works, the Religious Technology Center (“Center”), brought a direct 
infringement claim against Erlich.  Less predictably, however, the Center also brought a 
direct infringement claim against Netcom—the ISP that enabled Erlich to access the 
newsgroup.170  As a basis for this claim, the Center asserted that Netcom violated the 
reproduction right when its computers automatically made copies of the works Erlich 
uploaded.171         
In granting summary judgment in 1995 for Netcom on the direct liability claim, 
the Northern District of California defined when one becomes a direct infringer.  While 
the court acknowledged that copyright infringement is a strict liability tort, meaning 
“[d]irect infringement does not require intent or any particular state of mind,”172 it wrote 
“there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking where a 
defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.”173  It added:  
Where the infringing subscriber is clearly directly liable for the same act, 
it does not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of 
countless parties whose role in the infringement is nothing more than 
setting up and operating a system that is necessary for the functioning of 
the Internet . . . . The court does not find workable a theory of 
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infringement that would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that 
cannot reasonably be deterred.174 
 
In other words, before a defendant can be held directly liable, he must engage in 
some type of volitional conduct that violates the Copyright Act.175  Because Netcom 
passively took commands from its users, it failed to meet this standard and thus escaped 
liability for direct copyright infringement. 
Subsequent to Netcom, numerous federal Courts of Appeals and District Courts 
adopted the standard that direct liability requires volitional conduct.176  In doing so, these 
courts protected a variety of automated systems that operate pursuant to user commands 
from a range of copyright infringement suits.177  Congress also took part in the action, 
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codifying many of the protections offered by Netcom in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.178   
Cablevision, a 2008 case highly relevant to the litigation surrounding Aereo, 
illustrates the development of the volitional-conduct requirement.  There, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit evaluated, among other things, whether 
Cablevision could be held directly liable for violating the reproduction right after its 
Remote Storage DVR System (“RS-DVR”) produced copies of copyrighted television 
programs.179  The RS-DVR enabled customers who did not “have a stand-alone DVR to 
record cable programming on central hard drives housed and maintained by Cablevision 
at a ‘remote’ location.”180   
Adopting Netcom’s volitional-conduct requirement, the Second Circuit wrote that 
the outcome of the direct infringement claim turned on who made the copies of the 
television programs.181  According to the court, the direct infringement claim would fail 
if Cablevision’s customers, who selected the programs they wanted to record, were 
deemed to have made the copies.182  In contrast, the direct infringement claim would 
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succeed if Cablevision itself—through its design, housing, and maintenance of the RS-
DVR—was deemed to have done so.183 
The Second Circuit ruled the copies were made by Cablevision’s customers and 
dismissed the direct infringement claim.  In reaching this holding, the court drew 
parallels with the Supreme Court’s decision in Sony.  “In the case of a VCR, it seems 
clear . . . that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make 
the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who 
manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine,” the court 
wrote.184  “We do not believe that an RS–DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable 
from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies 
that are made automatically upon that customer’s command.”185  Thus, under 
Cablevision, the volitional conduct necessary for direct liability exists when a party 
commands an automated system to make a copy.  In other words, the question of volition 
comes down to a determination of which party pushes the record button.186   
Although the volitional-conduct requirement has been widely accepted, some 
courts have interpreted it narrowly—choosing to impose direct liability upon automated 
services that act as something more than a passive provider.187  Playboy Enterprises, Inc. 
v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc.,188 serves as an excellent example of this principle.  In that 
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1997 case, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, in spite of adhering 
to the volitional-conduct requirement, deemed the operator of an online Bulletin Board 
Service (“BBS”) liable for direct copyright infringement after its users uploaded 
copyrighted images to the service.  Central to the court’s ruling were the facts that the 
BBS created an incentive program for users to upload copyrighted images and that its 
employees screened all files before making them available to customers.189  As the court 
put it, “These two facts transform Defendants from passive providers of a space in which 
infringing activities happened to occur to active participants in the process of copyright 
infringement.”190  Thus, under Russ Hardenburgh, those who create and maintain 
automated systems that operate pursuant to user commands can become direct infringers 
if those automated systems cross the line between passive provider and active 
participant.191       
Numerous District Courts have reached similar conclusions.192  Even the Second 
Circuit in Cablevision, which took an expansive view of the volitional-conduct 
requirement, seemed impacted by Russ Hardenburgh.  The Second Circuit wrote, “We 
need not decide today whether one’s contribution to the creation of an infringing copy 
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may be so great that it warrants holding that party directly liable for the infringement, 
even though another party has actually made the copy.”193          
In addition to the courts that have taken a narrow view of the volitional-conduct 
requirement, some have rejected the doctrine outright.  In 2011, in Arista Records LLC v. 
Myxer Inc.,194 the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California refused to 
adopt the volitional-conduct requirement because it believed the requirement would add 
an element of intent to the strict liability tort of copyright infringement.  This decision, 
however, has been criticized.195  In 2013, the court in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews196 said 
the volitional-conduct requirement should be “equate[d] with the requirement of 
causation, not intent.”  Thus, instead of turning a strict liability tort into one that requires 
intent, the volitional-conduct requirement simply determines “whether the defendant 
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IV. The Supreme Court Determines Whether Aereo Performed 
A. The Majority Opinion: Arguing Aereo Performs Because it Resembles a 
Cable System 
To determine whether Aereo performed, the majority had to establish which 
party, Aereo or its subscribers, transmitted the broadcasters’ works.198  A conclusion that 
Aereo transmitted the works—through the creation, operation, and maintenance of its 
system—would mean Aereo performed.  Conversely, a conclusion that Aereo’s 
subscribers transmitted the works—through their selection of which programs to watch—
would mean the subscribers performed.  
In arguing that it did not perform, Aereo referenced numerous lower court 
opinions supporting “the sound principle that direct liability is inappropriate where a 
defendant programs equipment to respond ‘automatically’ to a user command that results 
in alleged infringement.”199  Because it did no more than supply equipment that users 
commanded, Aereo contended that it did not perform for the reason that it did not 
transmit the broadcasters’ works.200      
The majority disagreed.  In an opinion that failed to directly reference the 
volitional-conduct requirement, the majority concluded that Aereo performed because it 
resembled the CATV systems at issue in Fortnightly and Teleprompter—the ones that, 
according to the Copyright Act’s legislative history, Congress intended to bring within 
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the scope of copyright law.201  As the majority put it: “[T]he language of the [Copyright] 
Act does not clearly indicate when an entity “perform[s]” . . .  and when it merely 
supplies equipment that allows others to do so.  But when read in light of its purpose, the 
Act is unmistakable: An entity that engages in activities like Aereo’s performs.”202  The 
fact that “Aereo may . . . emulate equipment a viewer could use at home” had little 
impact on the majority because, as it wrote, the same could have been said of the services 
offered by the CATV systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter.203       
To support its decision, the majority referenced a definition of cable systems 
included in the Copyright Act’s legislative history.  According to the legislative history, 
“cable systems are commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are 
based on the carriage of copyrighted program material and that copyright royalties should 
be paid by cable operators to the creators of such programs.”204  To the majority, Aereo 
fell within this definition because it “sells a service that allows subscribers to watch 
television programs, many of which are copyrighted, virtually as they are being 
broadcast.”205   
Interestingly, however, the majority did not apply the definition for cable systems 
included within the text of the Copyright Act, which states:  
A “cable system” is a facility, located in any State, territory, trust territory, 
or possession of the United States, that in whole or in part receives signals 
transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more television broadcast 
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stations licensed by the Federal Communications Commission, and makes 
secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, 
microwave, or other communications channels to subscribing members of 
the public who pay for such service . . . .206   
 
The majority’s decision not to reference the Copyright Act’s definition may 
surprise some, as Justice Sotomayor expressed the opinion during oral arguments that 
Aereo’s service fell within the definition’s scope.207  Perhaps the majority’s reluctance to 
apply the definition can be attributed to the basic tenants of administrative law.  When 
reviewing a federal agency’s construction of a statute, courts are usually required to 
afford the agency’s interpretation with deference.  Typically, courts will apply Chevron 
deference, a two-step test for determining when an agency’s interpretation of a statute 
should be upheld.  Under the test, a court will uphold an agency’s construction of a 
statute if (1) “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” and (2) 
the agency's interpretation of the ambiguous issue is based on a permissible or reasonable 
construction of the statute.208       
Prior to the decision in Aereo III, the Copyright Office, a federal agency, had 
decided not to classify Internet retransmission services as cable systems under the 
Copyright Act.209  Had the majority deemed Aereo a cable system under the Copyright 
Act, it would have overruled the Copyright Office’s construction of the statute.  Such a 
ruling, however, could have been made only after affording the Copyright Office with 
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Chevron deference and deeming the Copyright Office’s construction of the statute 
unreasonable—an action the majority would have likely been unwilling to take.210 
B. The Dissenting Opinion: Arguing the Majority’s Rationale was Flawed and 
Offering Support for the Volitional-Conduct Requirement  
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia wrote 
the majority’s opinion suffered from a number of deficiencies.211  For one, Justice Scalia 
scolded the majority for its extensive reliance on legislative history.  He wrote: 
Perceiving the text to be ambiguous . . . the Court reaches out to decide the 
case based on a few isolated snippets of legislative history . . . . The Court 
treats those snippets as authoritative evidence of congressional intent even 
though they come from a single report issued by a committee whose 
members make up a small fraction of one of the two Houses of 
Congress.212     
 
Justice Scalia’s critique should hardly be surprising; he has long asserted that 
legislative history fails to serve as a valid indicator of Congressional intent.213  By 
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applying a test that determines whether one performs by asking whether he, she, or it 
“looks like” a CATV system, Justice Scalia said, the majority ran the risk of adopting “a 
two-tier version of the Copyright Act, one part of which applies to ‘cable companies and 
their equivalents’ while the other governs everyone else.”214 
Additionally, Justice Scalia wrote that the majority failed to apply its “looks like 
cable TV” standard correctly.  According to Justice Scalia, “material differences” existed 
between Aereo and the CATV systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter, differences that 
should have precluded a finding that Aereo resembled those systems.215  Perhaps the 
biggest difference, Justice Scalia wrote, was that the CATV systems in Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter “captured the full range of broadcast signals and forwarded them to all 
subscribers at all times, whereas Aereo transmit[ed] only specific programs selected by 
the user, at specific times selected by the user.”216     
As a final critique, Justice Scalia predicted that future courts would have great 
difficulty determining whether an entity performs because of its resemblance to cable 
                                                                                                                                            
greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.  We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of 
legislators.”); see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(“Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators' intentions. Where the language of those laws is 
clear, we are not free to replace it with an unenacted legislative intent.”); see also Lawson v. FMR LLC, 
134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176-77 (2014) (emphasis in original) (“Reliance on legislative history rests upon several 
frail premises.  First, and most important: That the statute means what Congress intended.  It does not.  
Because we are a government of laws, not of men, and are governed by what Congress enacted rather than 
by what it intended, the sole object of the interpretative enterprise is to determine what a law says.  Second: 
That there was a congressional ‘intent’ apart from that reflected in the enacted text.  On most issues of 
detail that come before this Court, I am confident that the majority of Senators and Representatives had no 
views whatever on how the issues should be resolved—indeed, were unaware of the issues entirely.  Third: 
That the views expressed in a committee report or a floor statement represent those of all the Members of 
that House.  Many of them almost certainly did not read the report or hear the statement, much less agree 
with it—not to mention the Members of the other House and the President who signed the bill.”).  
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systems.217  The majority, after all, provided little guidance in regard to how such 
assessments should be made.218  Specifically, Justice Scalia questioned whether an entity 
that solely transmitted previously recorded programs could resemble a cable system.219  
In his opinion, such entities could not because “cable companies did not offer remote 
recording and playback services when Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976.”220   
To Justice Scalia, the determination of whether Aereo performed should have 
been made through the application of the volitional-conduct requirement.  Although 
Justice Scalia acknowledged the Supreme Court has never expressly endorsed the 
requirement, he described it as being “ground[ed] in the [Copyright] Act’s text, which 
defines ‘perform’ in active, affirmative terms . . . .”221  In other words, because the 
Copyright Act defines to “perform” an audiovisual work as “‘show[ing] its images in any 
sequence’ or ‘mak[ing] the sounds accompanying it audible,’” the text implies that direct 
infringers must make some sort of affirmative, volitional act.222  Thus, in adopting the 
view that “[a] defendant may be held directly liable only if it has engaged in volitional 
conduct that violates the Act,” Justice Scalia described the question presented by Aereo’s 
service as “who does the performing.”223      
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The question presented by Justice Scalia in Aereo III is the public performance 
right equivalent of the question presented by the Second Circuit in Cablevision.  There, as 
noted, the Second Circuit sought to identify the direct infringer by determining “who 
made . . . [the] copy”?224  Although Justice Scalia and the Second Circuit asked similar 
questions, their answers differed dramatically.  To the Second Circuit, the person that 
pushes the record button supplies the necessary level of volitional conduct.225  If Justice 
Scalia had followed the Second Circuit’s logic, the answer to his question should have 
been the person who uses Aereo’s system to push the Watch button.  Justice Scalia, 
however, chose to take a different path.  Justice Scalia wrote that, in the majority of 
instances, the person or entity that engages in the volitional conduct necessary for direct 
liability will be the one that selects and arranges the copyright content.226  
Justice Scalia provided two examples to explain his reasoning.  First, he discussed 
a “copy shop [that] rents out photo-copiers on a per-use basis.”227  Under Justice Scalia’s 
reasoning, the shop would not be directly liable for copyright infringement if a patron 
used one of the shop’s machines to “duplicate a famous artist’s copyrighted photographs . 
. . .”228  Why?  Because the copy shop did not select the copyrighted content.229  As a 
second example, he discussed video-on-demand services like Netflix.  Similar to 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR, video-on-demand services are automated systems that operate 
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pursuant to user commands.  However, under Justice Scalia’s rationale, video-on-demand 
services can be held directly liable due to their selection of content.  In other words, 
Netflix’s act of selecting and arranging content for their subscribers to watch serves as a 
volitional act sufficient for the imposition of direct liability.230 
Applying this standard, Justice Scalia concluded that Aereo was closer to a copy 
shop than a video-on-demand service.  “Aereo does not provide a prearranged assortment 
of movies and television shows,” Justice Scalia wrote.231  “Rather, it assigns each 
subscriber an antenna that . . . can be used to obtain whatever broadcasts are freely 
available.”232  Thus, “for the sole and simple reason that it does not make the choice of 
content,” Justice Scalia ruled that Aereo does not “perform” and could not be held liable 
for directly infringing upon the broadcasters’ right to perform their works publicly.233   
Although Justice Scalia did not believe Aereo performed the broadcasters’ works, 
his dissent should not be equated with a belief that Aereo ought to escape liability.  
Indeed, Justice Scalia wrote that the lower courts should decide whether Aereo is 
secondarily liable for assisting its subscribers in infringing a completely different right—
the reproduction right.234  Under Justice Scalia’s view, because Aereo’s service makes 
copies of works each time one of its subscribers selects to Watch or Record a program, 
the broadcasters could have challenged Aereo’s subscribers for infringing upon their 
exclusive right to reproduce copyrighted works. 
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 For its part, the majority asserted that Justice Scalia’s selection-of-content 
argument made “too much out of too little.”235  According to the majority, when Aereo’s 
system is viewed in light of the purpose of the Copyright Act, the fact that Aereo’s users 
may select content should not be afforded dispositive weight.  After all, whether they or 
some other entity selects the content “means nothing to the subscriber” as it does little to 
enhance the viewing experience.236  
V. Discussion 
Future courts will undoubtedly struggle when applying the majority’s holding to 
the question of whether an entity performs.  Those courts will know that an entity 
performs if the entity resembles the CATV systems at issue in Fortnightly and 
Teleprompter.  They will not know, however, how to make the determination that such a 
resemblance exists.  As Justice Scalia astutely commented, “[The majority] provides no 
criteria for determining when its cable-TV-lookalike rule applies.”237   
Problems will surely arise if a court is called upon to assess Aereo’s recorded 
transmissions.  For instance, imagine a scenario where Aereo decides to adapt its 
business model to one in which it solely transmits recorded versions of television 
programs.  That is, Aereo delays all transmissions of a particular program until the 
program has finished airing.  Would Aereo be deemed to have performed under that 
scenario?  Justice Scalia, most likely correct, believes the answer is no because the 
CATV systems at issue in Fortnightly and Teleprompter did not transmit recorded 
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programs to subscribers.238  But reasonable minds could differ.  In concluding that Aereo 
performed, the majority referenced a definition of cable systems included within the 
Copyright Act’s legislative history.  This definition, “cable systems are commercial 
enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage of 
copyrighted program material,” would appear to encompass Aereo’s recorded 
transmissions.239  Consequently, if a future court were to apply that definition in an 
attempt to clarify what resembles an early CATV system, contrary to Justice Scalia’s 
belief, entities that solely transmit recorded versions of programs will be deemed to have 
performed those programs.              
Perhaps, then, Justice Scalia was correct in his advocacy of the volitional-conduct 
requirement.  Although the requirement has been criticized for being arbitrary,240 a means 
must exist to differentiate between direct and secondary liability.241  Put differently, if 
every potential infringer could be treated as a direct infringer, there would be no reason 
for secondary liability to exist.  Although the volitional-conduct requirement may not be 
perfect, it provides courts with a bright-line test to apply when identifying direct 
infringers.   
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The volitional-conduct requirement, furthermore, is consistent with the Copyright 
Act’s text.  Under the Copyright Act, the owner of a copyright is granted six exclusive 
rights, each of which provides the copyright holder with an affirmative power to take a 
particular action.  For example, a copyright holder has (among other rights) the right to 
reproduce a copyrighted work or perform a copyrighted work publicly.242  As a result of 
this wording, it necessarily follows that one must make an affirmative, volitional act to 
directly infringe upon another’s copyright.243  The volitional-conduct requirement, 
moreover, does not add an element of intent to the strict-liability tort of copyright 
infringement.  The requirement compels courts to determine the direct cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury; it does not compel them to determine whether a defendant possessed a 
particular state of mind when infringing upon another’s copyright.244        
Additionally, Justice Scalia’s approach to the volitional-conduct requirement is a 
reasoned one.  In Aereo III, Justice Scalia recognized, as the Northern District of Ohio 
did in Russ Hardenburgh, that even automated systems can cross the line between 
passive provider and active participant.  Thus, under his view of the volitional-conduct 
requirement, those automated systems that select content will be treated as direct 
infringers.  Because it permits courts to classify automated systems as direct infringers, 
Justice Scalia’s approach furthers the aim of the volitional-conduct requirement by 
providing courts with some leeway in identifying the direct cause of the plaintiff’s injury. 
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For the reasons mentioned above, Justice Scalia was right to believe that the 
majority should have applied the volitional-conduct requirement and that—because 
Aereo’s users selected the content—Aereo did not perform.  Thus, the question presented 
should have been whether Aereo was secondarily liable for copyright infringement.    
Had the Court engaged in a secondary liability analysis, the broadcasters would 
have argued that Aereo’s subscribers directly infringed the reproduction right when using 
the Watch feature to view content.  The subscribers, for their part, would have used Sony 
to argue that fair use protected their conduct.   
How the Court would have ultimately resolved the fair use inquiry is an open 
question.  In his dissent, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Scalia 
wrote, “I share the Court’s evident feeling that what Aereo is doing (or enabling to be 
done) to the Networks’ copyrighted programming ought not to be allowed.”245  This 
statement implies that the three dissenters would have ruled against fair use.  Whether 
two additional justices would have joined the dissenters is unclear.  Fair use, after all, is a 
balancing test that has been described as “the most enigmatic doctrine in U.S. copyright 
law.”246  
It should be noted that, even if the Court had deemed Aereo secondarily liable for 
the operation of its Watch feature, it does not follow that Aereo would have also been 
deemed secondarily liable for the operation of its Record feature.  Aereo’s Record feature 
is nothing more than a VCR within “the cloud.”  Because the Court found no secondary 
liability when such devices are used in the home, it would have been illogical for the 
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Court to conclude that secondary liability attaches when essentially the same device is 







CHAPTER IV: DID AEREO PERFORM THE 
BROADCASTERS’ WORKS PUBLICLY? 
After it concluded that Aereo performed the broadcasters’ works, the question for 
the Court became whether Aereo performed those works publicly.  Although appearing to 
be a simple question, courts have consistently struggled in defining when an entity or 
individual publicly performs a work.     
I. Statutory Text 
Two clauses in § 101 of the Copyright Act define when a work is performed 
publicly.  Under § 101, “[t]o perform a work ‘publicly’ means”:  
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place 
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a 
family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or 
 
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the 
work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any 
device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving 
the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times.247  
 
Under clause (1), a work is performed publicly in one of two situations.  The first 
situation occurs when a work is performed in a place open to the public.  For instance, 
one would engage in a public performance if he were to act out a play in a public park 
because the park is open to all.  The number of people in the park is of no relevance; a 
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public performance occurs if the performers have no audience.248  
The second situation occurs when a work is performed in a place that is not open 
to the public but in which a “substantial number” of people outside a normal circle of 
family or friends have gathered.  Here, to determine if a work has been performed 
publicly, courts evaluate the “size and composition” of the audience.249  Thus, 
performances that occur in “places such as clubs, lodges, factories, summer camps, and 
schools” can be considered public performances.250     
Clause (1) had no relevance to the litigation surrounding Aereo.  Aereo did not 
perform works in places open to the public or in “places that, although not open to the 
public at large, are accessible to a significant number of people.”251  Consequently, the 
Supreme Court addressed whether Aereo publicly performed copyrighted works under 
clause (2).  
Clause (2) is referred to as the “Transmit Clause.”  It states that to perform a work 
“publicly” means to “transmit . . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public” 
through use of any device or process, regardless of whether the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance are geographically or chronologically dispersed.252  
To “‘transmit’ a performance,” in turn, means “to communicate it by any device or 
process whereby images or sounds are received beyond the place from which they are 
                                                
248 See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 63 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[The Copyright Act] 
does not require that the public place be actually crowded with people.  A telephone booth, a taxi cab, and 
even a pay toilet are commonly regarded as ‘open to the public,’ even though they are usually occupied 
only by one party at a time.”).   
 
249 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
250 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 64 (1976). 
 
251 Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d at 158. 
 
252 17 U.S.C. § 101.   
 
 61 
sent.”253  Although the Copyright Act defines the verb “perform,”254 it fails to define the 
noun “performance” and the phrase “to the public.”255  
Courts have had difficulty applying the Transmit Clause—often reaching opposite 
conclusions when faced with the same question.256  One area of difficulty has been the 
Transmit Clause’s closing phrase, “whether the members of the public capable of 
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and 
at the same time or at different times.”257  Another area of difficulty, and one that played 
a major role in the litigation surrounding Aereo, has been defining “performance” under 
the Transmit Clause.   
II. Applying the Transmit Clause: Relevant Decisions Prior to Aereo 
One of the first cases to implicate the Transmit Clause was Columbia Pictures 
Industries, Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.258  There, in 1984, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
evaluated whether Maxwell’s Video Showcase, a video rental store chain, violated the 
public performance right by renting to paying customers “small, private booths” in which 
to watch video cassettes selected from Maxwell’s catalogue. 259  The rented booths 
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contained television sets but were not equipped with VCRs.260  For a motion picture to be 
played in the booth, a Maxwell’s employee placed the video cassette selected by the 
customer into a VCR at the front of the store.  The pictures and sounds accompanying the 
motion picture were then transmitted from the VCR to the television in the booth.261   
The Third Circuit held that Maxwell’s system violated the public performance 
right because, through operating a store in which “[a]ny member of the public can view a 
motion picture by paying the appropriate fee,” Maxwell’s was open to the public.262  The 
fact that customers viewed cassettes in private “did not mitigate the essential fact that 
Maxwell’s” was open to all.263   
Although it used clause (1) to settle the case, the Third Circuit wrote, in dicta, that 
its conclusion was “fully supported” by the Transmit Clause.264  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court looked to the work of famed copyright professor Melville Nimmer.  
In Nimmer on Copyright, Nimmer discussed the Transmit Clause in detail and attempted 
to provide meaning to the Clause’s closing phrase: “whether the members of the public 
capable of receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in separate 
places and at the same time or at different times.”265   
This phrase states that the public capable of receiving the performance can be “(1) 
in the same place at the same time, (2) in separate places at the same time, (3) in the same 
                                                




262 Id. at 159. 
 




265 2-8 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 814[C][2] (2014); Copyright 
Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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place at different times, or (4) in separate places at different times.”266  Although 
examples of options one and two are readily apparent,267 Congress’ intent in writing 
options three and four confused Nimmer.  Both of these options require the audience to 
be chronologically dispersed and, according to Nimmer, if taken literally, would turn all 
transmissions into public performances.268  Nimmer wrote:  
The Senate and House Reports offer no explanation of this latter phrase 
[“at the same time or at different times”], and it is difficult to believe that 
it was intended literally.  It would mean, for example, that the 
performance of music on a commercial phonograph record in the privacy 
of one’s home constitutes a public performance because other members of 
the public will be playing duplicates of the same recorded performance at 
“different times.”269  
 
Nimmer concluded that options three and four would make sense only “if the 
same copy (or phonorecord) of a given work is repeatedly played (i.e., ‘performed’) by 
different members of the public, albeit at different times . . . .”270  
Adopting this approach, the Third Circuit explained why Maxwell’s system 
publicly performed works under the Transmit Clause.  It wrote, “Although Maxwell’s has 
only one copy of each film, it shows each copy repeatedly to different members of the 
public.  This constitutes a public performance.”271 
                                                
266 Jeffrey Malkan, The Public Performance Problem in Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 89 
OR. L. REV. 505, 514 (2010). 
 
267 According to Malkan, an example of option one occurs when “[e]veryone is gathered in a theater to 
watch a concert or sporting event that is televised by a closed-circuit TV transmission.”  Id. at 514-15.  An 
example of option two occurs when “[e]veryone watches the televised event on his or her TVs at home.”  
Id. at 515. 
 
268 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 265, at §  8.14[C][2]; see also, Malkan, supra note 266, at 516.    
 
269 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 265, at §  8.14[C][2]. 
 
270 Id.; see also, Malkan, supra note 266, at 516. 
 
271 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc., 749 F.2d 154, 159 (3d Cir. 1984).  Yet, Nimmer’s 
explanation of the Transmit Clause can be criticized.  In the example he provided (that of the commercial 
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The Transmit Clause was next implicated in 1991 in On Command Video Corp. v. 
Columbia Pictures Industries.272  In On Command, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California evaluated whether On Command’s “system for the 
electronic delivery of movie video tapes” to hotel rooms infringed upon the plaintiffs’ 
right to publicly perform their copyrighted works.273  To use the system, a hotel guest 
would access a computer program embedded in the television set in his hotel room to 
select the movie he wanted to watch.274  The movie was then automatically transmitted to 
the guest’s room from a video cassette player centrally located in the hotel equipment 
room.275  
Without referencing Nimmer’s same copy idea, the Northern District of 
California held that On Command publicly performed works because it transmitted works 
                                                                                                                                            
phonograph record being played in the privacy of one’s home), no performance is being transmitted.  Thus, 
the Transmit Clause should not be implicated.  Many courts, moreover, avoid the fear Nimmer spoke of 
(that is, his fear that a literal reading of the Transmit Clause would turn all performances into public 
performances) by resetting the analysis of whether a work is performed publicly each time the identity of 
the transmitter changes.  See generally Am. Broad. Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2509 
(2014); Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 136 (2d Cir. 2008); FilmOn X, 
No. 13-785, 2013 WL 4763414 at * 13; Malkan, supra note 265, at 529.  For instance, by focusing on the 
identity of the transmitter, a work would be performed publicly when a CBS affiliate broadcasts an episode 
of The Big Bang Theory.  A work would not be performed publicly, however, when an individual transmits 
that same episode from one room in his house to another.  Under that scenario, the transmission is not being 
sent to the public because it is only made available to the individual and, perhaps, the members of his 
family.   
 
For a more recent adoption of Professor Nimmer’s “same copy” idea, see Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. 
WTV Sys, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1011 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (ruling the defendant violated the public 
performance right when it streamed content from DVDs to subscribers because “the same DVD . . . [was] 
used over and over again to transmit performances of Plaintiffs’ Copyrighted Works.”)  
 
272 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 
273 Id. at 788. 
 





to the public.276  It wrote, “[W]hether the number of hotel guests viewing an On 
Command transmission is one or one hundred, and whether these guests view the 
transmission simultaneously or sequentially, the transmission is still a public performance 
since it goes to members of the public.”277  In hindsight, the decision in On Command is a 
straightforward application of the Transmit Clause.278  What remains controversial about 
the decision, however, was the Northern District of California’s classification of what 
makes someone a member of “the public.”  The court wrote that the hotel guests were 
members of the public “because the relationship between the transmitter of the 
performance, On Command, and the audience, hotel guests, is a commercial, ‘public’ 
one . . . .”279  In other words, we become members of the public when we have a 
commercial relationship with the transmitter.280  
                                                




278 For an additional basic application of the Transmit Clause, see Entertainment and Sports Programming 
Network, Inc. v. Edinburg Cmty. Hotel, 735 F. Supp. 1334 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (holding that a motor hotel 
infringed upon the plaintiffs’ copyrights when it intercepted and then transmitted ESPN and HBO’s 




280 The Northern District cites no references for its assertion that the relationship between the transmitter 
and receiver dictates whether one is a member of the public.  The court’s rationale, moreover, has been 
criticized.  In Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008), the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals described the Northern District’s interpretation as “untenable.”  It wrote:  
 
If Congress had wished to make all commercial transmissions public performances, the 
transmit clause would read: “to perform a work publicly means . . . to transmit a 
performance for commercial purposes.”  In addition, this interpretation overlooks, as 
Congress did not, the possibility that even non-commercial transmissions to the public 
may diminish the value of a copyright.   
 
Id.  For additional cases that implicate the public performance right from this era, see David v. 
Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  There, the Southern 
District of New York determined whether Showtime/The Movie Channel (“SMC”) infringed the 
public performance right when it transmitted works to cable system operators who, in turn, 
transmitted those works to the public.  Id. at 758.  Although acknowledging that “Congress . . . did 
not anticipate the eventual proliferation of organizations  . . . who ‘broadcast’ their programs to the 
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The last relevant case to implicate the Transmit Clause was Cartoon Network LP, 
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (“Cablevision”) in 2008.281  There, in addition to 
determining whether Cablevision or its subscribers engaged in volitional conduct, the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether Cablevision’s RS-DVR 
violated “the Copyright Act by engaging in unauthorized public performances . . . .”282  
As noted, Cablevision’s RS-DVR permitted customers who did not “have a stand-alone 
DVR to record cable programming on central hard drives housed and maintained by 
Cablevision at a ‘remote’ location.’”283  Recordings made with the RS-DVR were unique, 
                                                                                                                                            
public indirectly,” the Southern District nevertheless held that SMC’s transmissions to cable 
systems constituted public performances.  Id. at 759.  It wrote:  
 
[I]t seems apparent from the scope of the examples provided in the legislative history that 
Congress intended the definitions of “public” and “performance” to encompass each step 
in the process by which a protected work wends its way to its audience.  Moreover, it 
would strain logic to conclude that Congress would have intended the degree of copyright 
protection to turn on the mere method by which television signals are transmitted to the 
public.  Id. 
 
For cases reaching similar holdings, see National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 
10, 11-12 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing David with approval and holding that PrimeTime performed works 
publicly by transmitting NFL footage from the United States to a single satellite even though the footage 
was eventually transmitted to subscribers in Canada, “a foreign country where the Copyright Act does not 
apply.”); WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(finding that an intermediate carrier that captured broadcast signals and then retransmitted them to cable 
systems was not immune from copyright liability because “the Copyright Act defines ‘perform or 
display . . . publicly’ broadly enough to encompass indirect transmission to the ultimate public . . . .”); but 
see Allarcom Pay Television v. General Instrument Corp., F.3d. 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1995) (writing that for 
“U.S. copyright law to apply, at least one alleged infringement must be completed entirely within the 
United States,” meaning the public performance right cannot be infringed until a work is performed in a 
place open to the public or transmitted to the public). 
 
281 536 F.3d 121 (2008). 
 
282 Id. at 134. 
 
283 Id. at 124.  Cablevision viewed its RS-DVR as a technological step forward that would eliminate many 
of the inefficiencies associated with traditional DVRs.  “Set-top DVRs . . . have shortcomings—
Cablevision must install an individual unit with an expensive hard drive in each home, and repairs or 
upgrades require disruptive house calls.”  AEREO AND THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT 7 (Cablevision 
White Paper Dec. 2013).  “Centralized storage and processing allows technology providers to offer services 
more efficiently and conveniently.”  Id. at 8.    
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meaning that subscribers did not share copies of recordings.284  When a subscriber 
selected a program for playback using the RS-DVR, the transmission sent to that 
subscriber was generated from the subscriber’s unique copy and could only be received 
by that single subscriber.285  Interpreting the Copyright Act, the Second Circuit held that 
Cablevision’s RS-DVR did not infringe the public performance right “[b]ecause the RS-
DVR system, as designed, only makes transmissions to one subscriber” and not to the 
public.286  
Although difficult to comprehend, the Second Circuit’s approach to the Transmit 
Clause can be explained.  As noted, the Transmit Clause states that to perform a work 
“publicly” means “to transmit . . . a performance . . . of the work . . . to the public . . . 
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance . . . receive it in 
the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”287  
Unfortunately, the Copyright Act does not define the word “performance.”288  One can 
assume, however, the word “performance” refers to the performance of a copyrighted 
work (for example, the performance of an episode of The Big Bang Theory).  While 
acknowledging this type of performance, the Second Circuit recognized an additional 
type of performance.  According to the Second Circuit, the “transmission of a 
performance is . . . [also] a performance.”289  Under this rationale, a performance occurs 
                                                
284 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP, 536 F.3d at 135. 
 
285 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 689 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 
286 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP, 536 F.3d at 137. 
 
287 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 
288 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP, 536 F.3d at 134 (emphasis added).  
 
289 Id.   
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when a cable system transmits a television program from its headend into one of its 
subscriber’s homes.  Importantly, the Second Circuit said the Transmit Clause should be 
applied by determining whether the public is capable of receiving the performance that 
constitutes the transmission.290 
The key to comprehending the opinion in Cablevision is to understand that a work 
is performed publicly when a transmission containing a performance of the work 
(because a transmission is a performance) is communicated to the public.  Thus, under 
the Second Circuit’s approach, a public performance would not occur if a cable system 
made 15,000 discrete transmissions of the same episode of The Big Bang Theory to single 
subscribers.  Why?  Because each transmission is going to a single subscriber and not to 
the public.  In contrast, if a cable system were to send a single transmission of an episode 
of The Big Bang Theory to 15,000 subscribers, a public performance would occur.  Why?  
Because the single transmission is going to 15,000 subscribers, a number that clearly 
constitutes “the public.”   
III. Applying the Transmit Clause: The Lower Courts Determine Whether Aereo 
and FilmOn Performed the Broadcasters’ Works Publicly 
Before the Supreme Court heard Aereo III, numerous lower courts evaluated 
whether Aereo and FilmOn, a substantially similar system, performed works publicly.291  
                                                
290 Id. 
 
291 See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that Aereo did not perform 
works publicly and denying broadcasters’ request for a preliminary injunction); Cmty. Television of Utah, 
LLC v. Aereo, Inc., No. 2:13CV910DAK, 2014 WL 642828 (D. Utah Feb. 19, 2014) (holding that Aereo 
performed works publicly and granting the broadcasters’ request for a preliminary injunction); Hearst 
Stations Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D. Mass. 2013) (holding that Aereo did not perform works 
publicly and denying Hearst’s request for a preliminary injunction); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 46 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that FilmOn performed works publicly and 
granting the broadcasters’ request for a preliminary injunction); Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
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As a result of these divergent holdings, a split over how to interpret the Transmit Clause 
developed amongst the courts.   
At the heart of the split was a disagreement over what constitutes a “performance” 
under the Transmit Clause.  Writing in 2013 that it was bound by the decision in 
Cablevision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Aereo II292 took the approach that 
the Transmit Clause’s use of the word “performance” “refers not to the performance of 
the underlying [copyrighted] work but rather to the transmission itself . . . .”293  Working 
off this premise, the Second Circuit in Aereo II ruled that Aereo did not publicly perform 
works because “the potential audience of each Aereo transmission” is a single user.294  
Vital to the court’s ruling was its finding that two essential features of Cablevision’s RS-
DVR were also present in Aereo’s system.295  Those features were that (1) Aereo created 
unique copies of programs and (2) only one Aereo subscriber could view the transmission 
created by that unique copy.296  
Not bound by the Second Circuit’s ruling in Cablevision, in 2012, the U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of California in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC297 took an alternate approach.  Under its approach, 
the word “performance” in the Transmit Clause refers to the performance of the 
                                                                                                                                            
BarryDriller Content Sys., 915 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that FilmOn performed 
works publicly and granting the broadcasters’ request for a preliminary injunction). 
 
292 WNET, Thirteen, 712 F.3d 676. 
 
293 Id. at 694. 
 




296 Id. at 689. 
 
297 915 F.Supp.2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
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copyrighted work.  Thus, the Central District of California said the Transmit Clause 
should be applied by determining whether copyrighted works (e.g., episodes of The Big 
Bang Theory) are transmitted to the public.298  It wrote:  
[The Copyright Act’s] concern is with the performance of the copyrighted 
work . . . . Very few people gather around their oscilloscopes to admire the 
sinusoidal waves of a television broadcast transmission.  People are 
interested in watching the performance of the work.  And it is the public 
performance of the copyrighted work with which the Copyright Act, by its 
express language, is concerned.299 
 
Applying this standard, the Central District of California held that FilmOn 
performed works publicly because, regardless of whether only single subscribers could 
receive the transmissions it sent, FilmOn transmitted copyrighted works to the public.300  
Under this interpretation of the Transmit Clause, an entity’s discrete transmissions of the 
same copyrighted work are aggregated to determine if the public is capable of receiving 
that copyrighted work.301    
To explain the Central District of California’s rationale, consider the example 
discussed above of the cable system that makes 15,000 discrete transmissions of the same 
episode of The Big Bang Theory to single subscribers.  Under the Central District’s 
approach, the cable system’s discrete transmissions are aggregated to see if, in the 
aggregate, a copyrighted work is being sent to the public.  Here, the cable system would 
                                                
298 Id. at 1144. 
 
299 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
300 Id. at 1143. 
 
301 The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia adopted the same approach to the Transmit Clause.  
Ruling that FilmOn publicly performed works, the District of Columbia wrote, “By making available 
Plaintiffs’ copyrighted performances to any member of the public who accesses the FilmOn X service, 
FilmOn X performs the copyrighted work publicly as defined by the Transmit Clause: Film On X 
‘transmit[s] ... a performance ... of the work ... to the public, by means of any device or process.’”  Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30, 46 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101). 
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be deemed to have performed works publicly because a copyrighted work (an episode of 
The Big Bang Theory) is being sent to the public.  The fact that 15,000 discrete 
transmissions are made is of no relevance.  Each transmission is added together to see if, 
overall, the public is capable of receiving the copyrighted work. 
The lower courts also addressed whether Aereo resembled a traditional cable 
system.  One court, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, ruled in 2014 that 
Aereo’s system was “indistinguishable” from that of a cable system and thus “falls 
squarely within the language of the Transmit Clause.”302  In contrast, the Second Circuit 
in Aereo II disregarded the broadcasters’ assertions that Aereo resembled a cable system, 
writing that such an argument failed to provide a valid reason for why the holding in 
Cablevision should not apply.303  
IV. The Supreme Court Determines Whether Aereo Performed the Broadcasters’ 
Works Publicly 
The majority of justices in Aereo III began their discussion by noting the 
competing interpretations of the Transmit Clause.304  Considering that this dispute caused 
a split among the lower courts, one would have expected the nation’s highest court to 
explicitly clarify the law.  It did not.  The Court felt it unnecessary to choose an 
                                                
302 Cmty. Television of Utah, LLC v. Aereo, Inc., No. 2:13CV910DAK, 2014 WL 642828 at *5 (D. Utah 
Feb. 19, 2014). 
 
303 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 694-95 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 
304 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2508; see Brief for Petitioners at 20, Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) (“The . . . [Second Circuit’s] myopic focus on the potential 
recipients of distinct transmissions is contradicted by the text of the statute, which asks whether an alleged 
infringer is transmitting a performance to the public, not whether multiple people are capable of receiving 
each transmission.”); see also Brief for Respondent at 22, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461) 
(“The Second Circuit correctly concluded that, to determine whether an accused infringer publicly performs 
by means of a transmission, the relevant performance is the transmission itself.”); see also Am. Broad. 
Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2508. 
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interpretation because, regardless of the interpretation it adopted, it said Aereo would still 
be deemed to have performed the broadcasters’ works publicly.305  
A. The Majority’s Primary Rationale: Aereo (Again) Resembles a Cable System 
Central to the majority’s holding was its conclusion that Aereo resembled cable 
systems, “which do perform ‘publicly.’”306  Although it acknowledged that, unlike cable 
systems, Aereo’s transmissions derived from unique copies and were sent to single 
subscribers, it deemed these differences inconsequential, writing: 
Viewed in terms of Congress’ regulatory objectives, why should any of 
these technological differences matter?  They concern the behind-the-
scenes way in which Aereo delivers television programming to its 
viewers’ screens.  They do not render Aereo's commercial objective any 
different from that of cable companies.  Nor do they significantly alter the 
viewing experience of Aereo's subscribers.  Why would a subscriber who 
wishes to watch a television show care much whether images and sounds 
are delivered to his screen via a large multisubscriber antenna or one small 
dedicated antenna, whether they arrive instantaneously or after a few 
seconds’ delay, or whether they are transmitted directly or after a personal 
copy is made?307  
 
Under the majority’s view, Aereo performed works publicly because its system 
was indistinguishable from the CATV systems Congress intended “to bring . . . within the 
Copyright Act’s scope.”308  As the majority put it, “Congress would as much have 
intended to protect a copyright holder from the unlicensed activities of Aereo as from 
those of cable companies.”309 
 
                                                
305Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2508. 
 
306 Id. at  2509. 
 
307 Id. at 2508-09. 
 
308 Id. at 2501. 
 
309 Id. at 2509. 
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B. The Majority’s Secondary Rationale: The Text of the Transmit Clause 
Supports the Finding that Aereo Performed the Broadcasters’ Works Publicly  
The majority in dicta engaged in a textual analysis to bolster its conclusion that 
Aereo publicly performed works.310  To show that Aereo’s defense would fail regardless 
of the interpretation of the Transmit Clause it applied, the majority adopted a qualified 
version of Aereo’s interpretation.311  Instead of agreeing that the “performance” Aereo 
transmits “is the . . . performance created by . . . [the] act of transmitting,” the Court 
wrote that to “transmit a performance of . . . an audiovisual work means to communicate 
contemporaneously visible images and contemporaneously audible sounds of the 
work.”312   
Under the majority’s adopted interpretation, the heart of Cablevision’s treatment 
of the Transmit Clause remains.  A work is still performed publicly if a transmission 
containing that work is sent to the public.  However, the majority identified an exception 
to this general principle.  Under the majority’s approach, a work is only performed 
publicly under the Transmit Clause if the public is capable of receiving a 
contemporaneously perceptible transmission containing the performance.  What does 
contemporaneously perceptible mean?  It means that the public must be capable of seeing 
and hearing the transmissions’ images and sounds at the same time it receives the 
                                                
310 “[Dicta] refers to a remark or expression of opinion that a court uttered as an aside, and is generally not 
binding authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule . . . . A dictum is any statement made by a court 
for use in argument, illustration, analogy or suggestion.  It is a remark, an aside, concerning some rule of 
law or legal proposition that is not necessarily essential to the decision and lacks the authority of 
adjudication.”  Exelon Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 234 Ill. 2d 266, 277, 917 N.E.2d 899, 907 (2009) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 
311 Id. at 2508.   
 
312 Id.  
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transmission.  Thus, a company that permits individuals to download works from the 
Internet cannot be deemed to perform works publicly under the Transmit Clause.  One 
downloads the program from the Internet and then, at a later time, watches the program.  
Contemporaneous perceptibility does not exist.  However, a company like Aereo that 
streams works over the Internet can be deemed to perform works publicly.  Why?  
Because the public can see and hear the transmission’s images and sounds at the same 
time it receives those transmissions.313  In other words, contemporaneous perceptibility 
exists.     
With contemporaneous perceptibility existing, the majority proceeded to rule that 
Aereo publicly performed works because “the [Transmit] Clause suggests that an entity 
may transmit a performance through multiple, discrete transmissions.”314  The majority 
wrote:  
[O]ne can transmit a message to one’s friends, irrespective of whether one 
sends separate identical e-mails to each friend or a single e-mail to all at 
once . . . .  By the same principle, an entity may transmit a performance 
through one or several transmissions, where the performance is of the 
same work.315  
 
                                                
313 The “contemporaneous” aspects of the Court’s definition of “to transmit a performance” derive from the 
Second Circuit’s holding in United States v. Am. Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, 627 F.3d 
64 (2d Cir. 2010).  In that case, the Second Circuit held that Internet companies do not publicly perform 
works when they “offer their customers the ability to download musical works over the Internet.”  Id. at 71.  
To reach this holding, the Second Circuit evaluated the Copyright Act’s definition of “perform,” which 
states (among other things) “that ‘[t]o ‘perform’ . . . a motion picture or other audiovisual work . . . [is] to 
show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.’”  Id. at 73 (quoting 17 
U.S.C. §101).  An inherent aspect of this definition, the Second Circuit wrote, is “contemporaneous 
perceptibility.”  Id.  In other words, for a work to be performed, the audience must perceive the work at the 
time of the performance (that is, in the Second Circuit’s view, transmission).  Thus, a performance occurs 
when an Internet company streams a musical work because “the song is perceived simultaneously with the 
transmission.”  Id. at 74.  But this is not the case when a musical work is made available for download.  
“Unlike musical works played during radio broadcasts and stream transmissions, downloaded musical 
works are transmitted at one point in time and performed at another.”  Id. at 74. 
   
314 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2509. 
 
315 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Thus, even if the relevant performance is considered the “transmission of the 
performance,” the majority found that Aereo performs works publicly because its discrete 
transmissions of a given work constitute a singular performance that the public is capable 
of receiving.316  Accordingly, the majority wrote, “[T]he fact that Aereo transmits via 
personal copies of programs” has no impact on whether it performs works publicly.317  
This conclusion, which rejects Professor Nimmer’s “same copy” idea, is so because 
regardless of whether “the same or separate copies” are used, a performance is ultimately 
transmitted to the public.  
An example may clarify the majority’s rationale.  Imagine that 15,000 Aereo 
subscribers use Aereo’s Watch feature to view a particular episode of The Big Bang 
Theory airing on CBS at 8:00 p.m.  To serve its subscribers, Aereo would have made 
15,000 discrete transmissions of the episode.  Under the majority’s approach, and unlike 
the holdings in Cablevision and Aereo II, those discrete transmissions are not considered 
separate performances.  Rather, those 15,000 transmissions are considered individual 
parts of the same performance.  Because 15,000 subscribers clearly constitute “the public,” 
Aereo is deemed to have transmitted a performance to the public and violated CBS’s 
right to publicly perform its copyrighted work.318       
                                                
316 See generally Kimberlianne Podlas, Applying Aereo to the Internet: Understanding Volitional Links to 
Leaked Films, Television Episodes, and Scripts As Copyright Infringement, 18 J. INTERNET L. 1, 16 (2014). 
 
317 Am. Broad. Cos.,134 S. Ct. at 2509. 
 
318 Mitch Stoltz, a staff attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, criticized the majority’s textual 
analysis—stating that it was driven by the Court’s desire to classify Aereo as a cable system.  Mitch Stoltz, 
Symposium: Aereo Decision Injects Uncertainty into Copyright, SCOTUSBLOG, June 27, 2014, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-aereo-decision-injects-uncertainty-into-copyright/.  
Stoltz’s assessment of the majority’s textual analysis as “outcome driven” is correct.  The majority, after 
all, began its textual analysis by writing, “The text of the Clause effectuates Congress’ intent.”  Am. Broad. 
Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2509.   
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In addition to adding a dimension to the meaning of “performance,” the majority 
defined what constitutes “the public.”  Evaluating the text of the Transmit Clause, which 
states that a work is performed publicly when transmitted “to a place specified by clause 
(1) or to the public,”319 the majority said “the public” must consist “of a large group of 
people outside of a family and friends.”320  The majority, nonetheless, placed a caveat on 
this definition.  Drawing parallels with the decision in On Command,321 the majority 
wrote that whether a group of people “constitute ‘the public’ often depends upon their 
relationship with the underlying work.”322  According to the majority, that relationship is 
dictated by ownership.  It wrote, “[A]n entity that transmits a performance to individuals 
in their capacities as owners or possessors [of content] does not perform to ‘the public,’ 
whereas an entity like Aereo that transmits to large numbers of paying subscribers who 
lack any prior relationship to the works does so perform.”323   
C. Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
 Justice Scalia felt it unnecessary to address whether Aereo performed publicly 
due to his conclusion that Aereo “[did] not perform at all . . . .”324  
V. Discussion 
 As with the question of whether an entity performs, future courts will struggle in 
applying the majority’s holding to the inquiry of whether one does so publicly.  Here 
                                                
319 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 
320 Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2510.   
 
321 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
 




324 Id. at 2514 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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again, the majority provided little guidance on how to determine whether an entity 
resembles an early CATV system.  Although the majority engaged in a textual analysis of 
the Transmit Clause, this analysis also stands to produce confusion. 
At the outset of its discussion of whether Aereo performed publicly, the majority 
wrote that it was adopting, for the sake of the argument, an interpretation of the Transmit 
Clause under which “to transmit a performance of . . . an audiovisual work means to 
communicate contemporaneously visible images and contemporaneously audible sounds 
of the work.”325  But at later points in the opinion, the majority confusingly appeared to 
adopt this interpretation, one that was only supposed to be adopted for the sake of the 
argument, as a new standard.  For example, toward the end of the textual analysis the 
majority wrote: “Therefore, in light of the purpose and text of the Clause, we conclude 
that when an entity communicates the same contemporaneously perceptible images and 
sounds to multiple people, it transmits a performance to them regardless of the number of 
discrete communications it makes.”326   
How should future courts deal with the majority’s puzzling treatment of the 
Transmit Clause?  One would assume that future courts should be free to ignore the 
majority’s textual analysis of the Transmit Clause.  It constitutes dicta and, after all, was 
adopted for the sake of the argument.  Nevertheless, the majority’s lack of precision in 
this area will surely produce confusion in the lower courts for years to come.        
Even more troubling is the fact that the majority’s adopted standard, which could 
possibly be interpreted as a new standard, treats the transmission as the relevant 
                                                
325 Id. at 2508. 
 
326 Id. at 2509; see also id. at 2510 (“[A]n entity only transmits a performance when it communicates 
contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds of a work.”). 
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performance.  This is troubling because, unlike the Second Circuit in Cablevision, the 
majority made no attempt to identify support for such an interpretation within the text or 
legislative history of the Copyright Act. 
New business models could result if the majority’s adopted standard is, in fact, a 
new standard.  If “to transmit a performance of . . . an audiovisual work means to 
communicate contemporaneously visible images and contemporaneously audible sounds 
of the work,” a future company should be free to transmit audiovisual works to 
subscribers without violating the public performance right so long as it does not transmit 
those performances contemporaneously.  Put differently, Aereo could change its business 
model to one in which it makes performances available for download because a work that 
must be downloaded cannot be communicated contemporaneously.  
To provide maximum clarity for future courts, the majority should have expressly 
interpreted the meaning of the Transmit Clause.  That interpretation, as the U.S. District 
Court for the Central District of California advocated for in Fox Television Stations, Inc. 
v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC,327 should have included a conclusion that the 
word “performance” refers to the performance of the copyrighted work—not to the 
transmission of the performance.  When Congress wrote the Transmit Clause, it said that 
to perform a work “publicly” means “to transmit . . . a performance . . . to the public” and 
referred to “the public capable of receiving the performance . . . .”328  Congress did not 
                                                
327 915 F.Supp.2d 1138 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
 
328 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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say that to perform a work “publicly” means “to transmit  . . . a transmission . . . to the 
public” or refer to “the public capable of receiving the transmission . . . .”329   
The Second Circuit in Cablevision violated the tenants of statutory construction 
when it deemed the transmission of a performance as the relevant performance.  When 
interpreting a statute, one must give the words included within it their “ordinary 
meaning.”330  Defining “performance” to mean the transmission of a performance 
frustrates this basic principle.  As the Eleventh Circuit wrote, “The rule is that ‘we must 
presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said.’”331 
With the emphasis placed on the performance of the copyrighted work, the 
majority should have then, quite simply, asked whether Aereo transmitted copyrighted 
works to the public.  In making this determination, the majority should have been mindful 
to aggregate Aereo’s discrete transmissions of the same copyrighted work.  Doing so 
would have permitted the majority to see that, regardless of whether only a single 
subscriber could receive one of its transmissions, Aereo nevertheless transmitted works to 
the public.       
Additionally, deeming the relevant performance under the Transmit Clause as the 
copyrighted work would not have led to the fear identified by Professor Nimmer.  As 
noted, Professor Nimmer expressed the concern that particular interpretations of the 
                                                
329 See generally Krista Consiglio, Note, Aereo and Filmon: Technology's Latest Copyright War and Why 
Aereo Should Survive, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2557, 2595 (2014) (“The fact that the transmit clause says 
“capable of receiving the performance” indicates that the Act concerns the underlying performance and not 
the individual transmission.”). 
 
330 See United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997). 
 
331 CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States 
v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc)). 
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Transmit Clause could turn all transmissions into public performances332—a concern that 
led to the “same copy” idea, which the majority rejected in Aereo III.   
The majority could have eliminated this fear by resetting the public performance 
right analysis each time the identity of the transmitter changed.  For instance, imagine 
that Aereo uses its system to transmit 15,000 unique copies of an episode of The Big 
Bang Theory to single subscribers.  Under that scenario, Aereo is the transmitter and the 
performance is the episode of The Big Bang Theory.  Aggregating the discrete 
transmissions, one can easily see that Aereo has publicly performed a copyrighted work.  
Aereo, after all, is transmitting an episode of The Big Bang Theory to 15,000 subscribers, 
a number that clearly constitutes the public.  
Now, imagine that an individual uses an antenna on his roof to transmit the same 
episode of The Big Bang Theory into his home.  Under this scenario, with the analysis 
being reset due to a change in the identity of the transmitter, the transmitter is the 
individual and the performance is, again, the episode of The Big Bang Theory.  Because 
the individual has transmitted The Big Bang Theory to only himself (and perhaps his 
family), the public performance right is not violated because the individual’s transmission 
has not gone to the public.  In other words, the individual has engaged in a private 
transmission because the transmission has not been sent to “a large group of people 
outside . . . [one’s] family and friends.”333  
  
                                                
332 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 265, at §  8.14[C][2]. 
 








CHAPTER V: THE IMPACT ON THE CLOUD 
In the not so distant past, consumers and companies were forced to store data on 
hard drives located within one’s computer or on a server located on-site.  Although local 
storage and computing provided users with quick access to data, it led to inefficiencies.334 
Physical hard drives and servers, at the end of the day, come with finite amounts of space 
and are expensive to purchase and maintain.335   
Today, consumers and companies have the option of storing data within “the 
cloud.”  Cloud computing “refers to the practice of using a network of remote servers 
hosted on the Internet to store, manage, and process data.”336  For instance, a consumer 
can store a digital music file or PDF on Google Drive or in Apple’s iTunes in the Cloud.  
Companies, for their part, can rent virtual servers from entities like Amazon to run 
applications central to their businesses.337         
                                                
334 See Eric Griffith, What Is Cloud Computing? PC MAG., MAR. 13, 2013, 
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0%2c2817%2c2372163%2c00.asp.; Brief of BSA | The Software Alliance 
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 at 2 (No. 13-461). 
 
335 Brief of Computer & Communications Industry Association and Mozilla Corporation as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Respondent at 5, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461). 
 
336 Brief of Amici Curiae of the Computer & Communications Industry Association and the Internet 
Association in Support of Affirmance at 5, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461). 
 
337 See AMAZON WEB SERVICES: AMAZON ELASTIC COMPUTE CLOUD (EC2), http://aws.amazon.com/ec2/ 
(last visited Aug. 17, 2014). 
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Although cloud computing has been criticized as an unsecure way to store data,338 
many consider the cloud to be “the future of information technology.”339  Regardless of 
its future, no one can question the impact it has on today’s economy—generating billions 
in revenue each year.340  
I. Aereo Argues Policy 
In its brief, Aereo argued that if the Supreme Court adopted an interpretation of 
the Transmit Clause under which the relevant performance is considered the copyrighted 
work, the future of cloud computing would be in jeopardy.  According to Aereo, such an 
interpretation would force courts to aggregate an entity’s discrete transmissions of a 
given work when determining if the public is capable of receiving that work.341  As a 
result of such aggregation, cloud-based services would infringe the public performance 
right each time they transmitted copyrighted works to multiple customers.  Aereo 
explained, “[W]henever two users of a cloud-based ‘virtual locker’ service—such as 
Google Drive—separately play a song stored on the provider’s servers, the provider is 
publicly performing by transmitting the same ‘underlying’ performance to multiple 
members of the public.”342      
                                                
338 See Griffith, supra note 334; see also Sumit Passary, Cloud Computing is the Future but not if Security 
Problems Persist, TECH TIMES, JUNE 15, 2014, http://www.techtimes.com/articles/8449/20140615/cloud-
computing-is-the-future-but-not-if-security-problems-persist.htm. 
 
339 Brief of BSA | The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Am. Broad. Cos., 
134 S. Ct. 2498 at 2, 5, 11 (No. 13-461).  
 
340 An estimated $47.4 billion was spent on public cloud-computing services in 2013.  Id. at 11 (citing Int'l 
Data Corp., IDC Forecasts Worldwide Public IT Cloud Services Spending (Sept. 3, 2012)).     
 
341 Brief for Respondent at 17-18, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461). 
 
342 Id. at 49; see also AEREO AND THE PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHT 15 (Cablevision White Paper Dec. 
2013) (using similar examples to make the same argument).   
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Numerous amici supported this argument,343 which should hardly be surprising.  
Many tech companies viewed “Cablevision as an authoritative interpretation of the 
Transmit Clause,”344 and research has found that the decision in Cablevision served as a 
major boon to the cloud-computing industry.345   
II. The Majority Distinguishes Aereo from “Different Kinds of Technologies” 
Although none of the lower courts that evaluated Aereo and FilmOn’s systems 
discussed in detail the impact its rulings could have on the cloud, the majority of justices 
seemed genuinely concerned about “impos[ing] copyright liability on other technologies, 
including new technologies . . . .”346  The majority of justices, nevertheless, believed it 
could issue a “limited holding” in the broadcasters’ favor without impacting the 
                                                
343 See, e.g., Brief of Computer & Communications Industry Association and Mozilla Corporation as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 3, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461) (“Adoption of 
petitioners’ position would threaten one of the most important emerging industries in the U.S. economy: 
cloud computing.”); Brief of Filmon X, LLC et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 27, Am. 
Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461) (“Arguing that the Networks have failed to sensibly distinguish 
Aereo from ‘other cloud-based services’ and writing that “[u]nder the Networks’ construction of the 
Transmit Clause, countless cloud technologies would potentially enable improper public transmissions of 
copyrighted work in the same way as Aereo.”); Brief of Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 6, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461) (Writing that 
the broadcasters’ approach to the Transmit Clause “could overturn or subvert” the “principles upon which 
cloud computing relies.”); Brief of Cablevision Systems Corporation as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 2-3, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461) (“[P]etitioners advance expansive 
arguments that needlessly cast doubt on other technologies, including both the RS-DVR and a vast array of 
other cloud-based services that consumers use to store and play back lawful recordings.”); Brief of BSA | 
The Software Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 2, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 
2498 (No. 13-461) (“This case, which requires the Court to construe the Copyright Act's Transmit Clause, 
could have very significant repercussions for the future of cloud computing.”). 
 
344 WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 696 n.19 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 
345 A study out of Harvard Business School suggested “that the Cablevision decision led to additional 
incremental investment in U.S. cloud computing firms that ranged from $728 million to approximately $1.3 
billion over the two-and-a-half years after the decision.”  Josh Lerner, The Impact of Copyright Policy 
Changes on Venture Capital Investment in Cloud Computing Companies, at 1 (2011), available at 
http://tiny.cc/9dxldx. 
 
346Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. at 2510; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 8, 12-13, 15, 17-19, 44-
51, Am. Broad. Cos., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (No. 13-461).   
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development of “different kinds of technologies,” an ambiguous term that would 
seemingly include cloud-computing services.347  The majority offered four reasons why.  
First, in wording that resonated with the heart of the Court’s holding, the majority 
wrote that technologies different from Aereo could be distinguished from early CATV 
systems.348  In other words, the fact that Aereo resembled a cable system does not mean 
that all other cloud-computing services do so.  The majority wrote, “[T]he history of 
cable broadcast transmissions that led to the enactment of the Transmit Clause informs 
our conclusion that Aereo ‘perform[s]’ but it does not determine whether different kinds 
of providers in different contexts also ‘perform.’”349    
Second, the majority found protections for developing technologies in its 
definition of “performance,” repeating that “an entity only transmits a performance when 
it communicates contemporaneously perceptible images and sounds of a work.”350  Under 
this definition, Apple’s iTunes would not transmit a performance when a user purchases a 
song.351  Why?  When a user purchases a song from iTunes, Apple typically transmits the 
song to the hard drive located on the user’s computer or phone, and the user subsequently 
plays the song at his or her convenience.  Thus, the sounds that accompany the song are 
not played at a time contemporaneously perceptible with the transmission. 352  Because 
                                                






350 Id.  Although the majority initially wrote it adopted this definition of “to transmit a performance” for the 
sake of the argument, here again, it appears as if the majority has adopted a new standard. 
 





contemporaneous perceptibility does not exist, Apple has not transmitted a performance 
under the Transmit Clause. 
Third, the majority referenced the commercial aspects of its definition of “the 
public.”  Stating that “the public” applies “to a group of individuals acting as ordinary 
members of the public who pay primarily to watch broadcast television programs,” it 
noted that this definition “does not extend to those who act as owners or possessors of the 
relevant product.”353  
Finally, the Court wrote, “[T]he doctrine of ‘fair use’ can help to prevent 
inappropriate or inequitable applications of the Clause.”354  Although the majority did not 
elaborate on this sentence, a general sense of its meaning can be extrapolated.  Fair use 
serves as an exception to the traditional laws of copyright, “‘a privilege in others than the 
owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his 
consent.’”355  In other words, copyright liability will not be imposed when a use is fair 
and reasonable, as would most likely be deemed the case when a cloud-computing 
service transmits a work lawfully owned by one of its customers.            
III. Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
In critiquing the vagueness of the majority’s “looks like cable TV” standard, 
Justice Scalia briefly mentioned the cloud.  Acknowledging the majority’s belief that its 
                                                
353 Am. Broad. Cos. 134 S. Ct. at 2510. 
 
354 Id. at 2511 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). 
 
355 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985) (quoting H. BALL, LAW 
OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). 
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holding would not adversely impact the cloud, he nevertheless wrote that such a promise 
could not be guaranteed “given the imprecision of its result-driven rule.”356 
IV. Discussion 
Aereo’s policy argument clearly impacted the majority, as evident from the 
numerous ways it attempted to distinguish Aereo’s system.  For the majority, the key was 
to deem Aereo an infringer while not jeopardizing the cloud in the process.  The majority 
will likely succeed in this endeavor.   
Under the majority’s new definition of “the public,” cloud-based systems like 
Google Drive, iTunes in the Cloud, and Sony’s UltraViolet will not infringe the public 
performance right when they transmit works their customers own.  Accordingly, the 
Court’s bright-line definition of “the public” should serve as a guiding principle for the 
growing cloud-computing industry—protecting cloud-computing companies from the 
fear they may inadvertently infringe another’s copyright.   
Although some courts have criticized the notion of adding a commercial element 
to the definition of “the public,”357 such an interpretation is consistent with the Copyright 
Act.  Congress failed to define “the public,” leaving it to the courts to interpret.  In Aereo 
III, the majority found that whether a set of people constitutes the public “often depends 
upon their relationship with the underlying work.”358  Such an interpretation is correct.  
When an individual asks a cloud-based system to playback a song he owns and stored in 
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357 See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (“If Congress 
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the cloud, an act he could have done on his local hard drive, the resulting performance is 
a private one.  This is so because the cloud-based system is, in a sense, returning the song 
to its lawful owner—not transmitting it to the public.  As the majority put it: “When, for 
example, a valet parking attendant returns cars to their drivers, we would not say that the 
parking service provides cars ‘to the public.’  We would say that it provides the cars to 
their owners.”359  
Unfortunately, the cloud-computing industry may not be able to receive guidance 
on whether its actions violate the Transmit Clause from the majority’s assertion that “an 
entity only transmits a performance when it communicates contemporaneously 
perceptible images and sounds of a work.”360  This standard may have been applied only 
for the sake of the argument and, at this point, should not serve as a guidepost for the 
cloud-computing industry. 
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
I. Reflections on Aereo III  
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Aereo III means that, for now, the broadcast 
business model will remain in tact.  Broadcasters will continue to earn billions of dollars 
in revenue from advertising and retransmission consent agreements.  Far from having a 
similar impact to that of craigslist on the newspaper industry, Aereo will be treated as a 
minor event in the successful story of broadcast television.  The ruling in Aereo III, as 
described, should also have little to no impact on the development of the burgeoning 
cloud-computing industry.   
Despite these certainties, how lower courts will interpret the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of the public performance right remains an open question.  It’s clear that, when 
faced with the question of whether an entity publicly performs a work, a court must first 
ask whether the entity’s system resembles an early CATV system.  Courts, as noted, may 
have difficulty making this decision, as the Supreme Court offered little guidance in this 
regard.  Nevertheless, if a court finds an entity’s system resembles an early CATV system, 
the entity will be deemed to have publicly performed works and the analysis should end.    
But what happens if the applicable court does not find the entity’s system 
resembles an early CATV system?  Under this scenario, how should a court determine 
whether an entity performs a work?  How should it determine whether it does so 
publicly?  This thesis has argued that, when determining if an entity performs a work, 
courts should apply the volitional-conduct requirement.  Although not perfect, the 
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volitional-conduct requirement is a reasoned and logical way to differentiate between 
direct and secondary infringers.  Additionally, although the majority chose not to apply 
the volitional-conduct requirement, no wording in its opinion exists that would preclude a 
court from doing so.  The dissenting opinion, in fact, should offer significant support to 
any court that pursues such a path.   
If, after applying the volitional-conduct requirement, a court determines an entity 
does not perform, the analysis should stop and no liability should be imposed upon the 
entity.  If, however, the volitional-conduct requirement reveals an entity does perform, 
the applicable court should proceed to analyze whether the entity performs works 
publicly.   
When determining if an entity’s system performs works publicly, this thesis has 
argued that courts should classify the relevant performance under the Transmit Clause as 
the copyrighted work (e.g., a performance of an episode of The Big Bang Theory).  
Courts, being mindful to reset the analysis each time the identity of the transmitter 
changes, should then determine whether that performance is transmitted to the public.  It 
is true that the majority, at times in the opinion, engaged in a textual analysis of the 
Transmit Clause under which the transmission of the performance is considered the 
relevant performance. Courts, in this regard, should ignore the majority’s analysis.  The 
majority prefaced its textual analysis by stating the analysis was being engaged in 
arguendo (that is, for the sake of the argument).  Because it is more consistent with the 
Copyright Act to treat the copyrighted work as the relevant performance, courts should 
not hesitate to do so when determining whether an entity performs works publicly.             
Notwithstanding the efforts of this thesis to clarify the decision in Aereo III, 
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courts and scholars may struggle with the Supreme Court’s lack of precision.  The Court 
had the opportunity to clarify both the volitional-conduct requirement and the Transmit 
Clause.  It did neither.  Instead, the Court issued a functionalistic holding under which 
future courts must first ask if one thing resembles another.  Reaching legal conclusion 
through analogy is a maligned practice.  As famed law professor Ronald Dworkin said: 
“[A]nalogy without theory is blind.  An analogy is a way of stating a conclusion, not a 
way of reaching one . . . .”361  A Harvard Law Review article that summarized the 
opinion in Aereo III added:    
[The majority’s] functionalist approach was useful in limiting the Court's 
holding to systems that are analogous to cable television, but introduced 
unpredictability into the law by ignoring doctrinal distinctions and 
adopting an approach that lacks a clear focus and scope.  The Court could 
have achieved the same result without resorting to this reasoning by 
analogy or could have reached the opposite outcome and let Congress 
correct the result if it had meant to bar Aereo's existence—either of which 
would have provided clearer guidance for future courts and innovators.362 
 
Despite these critiques, Aereo and the Supreme Court decision it produced will 
remain important chapters in the histories of broadcasting and copyright law.                                     
II. An Epilogue to Aereo III 
After issuing its decision in Aereo III, the Supreme Court remanded the case for 
further proceedings.  Following the remand, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York issued a nationwide preliminary injunction barring Aereo 
from retransmitting nearly live versions of broadcasters’ programs.363  As a result, Aereo 
                                                
361 Ronald Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 353, 371 (1997); see also Berkey v. Third Ave. 
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362 Copyright Act of 1976—Transmit Clause—ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., supra note 33, at 378. 
  
363 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 12-CV-1540, 2014 WL 5393867 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014). 
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is now prevented from retransmitting nearly live content in the one area of the country it 
once could: the Second Circuit.  Nevertheless, because the broadcasters did not challenge 
Aereo’s retransmissions of recorded programs, the District Court’s injunction does not 
extend to the retransmission of broadcast programs that have completed airing.364   
Despite the potential to engage in business models under which it retransmits 
recorded or non-contemporaneous versions of broadcast programs, following the issuance 
of the preliminary injunction, Aereo filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.365  
Although Aereo’s future does not look bright—Aereo always contended it possessed “no 
Plan B” if it lost the battle in Aereo III—all may not be lost.366  Even while in bankruptcy, 
Aereo’s executives have maneuvered to preserve the company’s future.     
As of this writing, Aereo is seeking to be classified as the thing it always claimed 
it was not: a cable system.367  Aereo’s arguments have not fallen on deaf ears, as the FCC 
has issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would change the definition of cable 
systems (specifically the definition of Multichannel Video Programming Distributors) to 
include companies that distribute television signals over the Internet.368           
As a cable system, Aereo would be able to take advantage of §111’s inexpensive 
                                                                                                                                            
 
364 Id. at 9. 
 





367 Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 12-CV-1540, 2014 WL 5393867 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 
2014); see also Keith M. Stolte, Is Cheap Internet TV Dead?  Duck Hunting Season Comes Early to the 
Supreme Court, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J., at *7 (2014). 
 
368 Promoting Innovation and Competition in the Provision of Multichannel Video Programming 
Distribution Services (proposed Dec. 19, 2014). 
 
 92 
compulsory license.  Nonetheless, it would be subject to the Cable Act’s provisions 
regarding retransmission consent.  In accordance with the retransmission consent rules, 
the broadcasters would be required to operate in “good faith” when negotiating with 
Aereo.  The broadcasters, however, would likely force Aereo to pay the same high-cost 
retransmission consent fees as the cable systems.  As a result, Aereo would no longer be 
able to offer customers a low-cost way of viewing broadcast television content.   
In the end, if Aereo succeeds in being classified as a cable system, the 
broadcasters would likely view Aereo as nothing more than an additional avenue to earn 
revenue from retransmission consent agreements.  Such a perspective would be a far cry 
from the broadcasters’ original fear of Aereo—that is, the fear of a disruptive technology 
capable of forever altering the medium’s future.     
III. Suggestions for Future Research 
 Legal scholars should steadfastly watch how the lower courts interpret Aereo III.  
Emphasis should be placed on two specific areas.  First, legal scholars should evaluate 
whether the decision in Aereo III impacts the development of the volitional-conduct 
requirement.  Although the majority in Aereo III declined to endorse the requirement, the 
dissent did.  Because of the dissent’s endorsement, will future courts be more likely to 
embrace the concept when deciding if an individual or entity performs?          
Second, scholars should evaluate how future courts interpret the Transmit Clause 
in light of the decision in Aereo III.  One question that must be answered is how future 
courts will determine whether an entity resembles an early CATV system.  Additionally, 
scholars should evaluate how future courts classify the relevant performance under the 
Transmit Clause.  Do they consider it to be the performance of the copyrighted work or 
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the transmission of the performance?  Because the Supreme Court’s treatment of this 
issue in Aereo III was highly confusing, this area remains ripe for additional legal 
scholarship.   
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